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I am using AES-CBC as a hash function which is encrypting a block of length n. The blocks, m = (m1, m2, ..., mn). The IV is one block long and the encryption key is length 128, 192 or 256 bits.

Will I get collisions? And if so, how could I find examples?

I expect to find collisions every 2^(n/2) hashes but I don't imagine this would allow me to find any matches in the next 10000000 years.

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    $\begingroup$ Welcome to Cryptography.SE. What is the origin of this question? Why do you need to hash with PRP instead of a PRF? Consider that how many AES-CBC encryptions your machine can execute in one second then you can decide the necessary time on a single machine while omitting to build a hashTable to find the collision effectively. $\endgroup$
    – kelalaka
    Commented Nov 4, 2021 at 21:32
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    $\begingroup$ Interestingly, if you only encrypt one block, what will you get? $\endgroup$
    – kelalaka
    Commented Nov 4, 2021 at 21:37
  • $\begingroup$ With AES, the hash will be the ciphertext of the last message block. Will it be dependent on finding a hash every 2^(n/2) or every 2^(128|192|256)/2?? $\endgroup$
    – jongjena
    Commented Nov 4, 2021 at 21:39
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    $\begingroup$ A block cipher is a family of permutations where a key selects one of the permutations. That is the real effect of the secret key!. So you have a fixed permutation. $\endgroup$
    – kelalaka
    Commented Nov 4, 2021 at 21:44
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    $\begingroup$ Ah I see, as AES is an injective function I suppose there wouldn't be any collisions but this slide I found indicates otherwise. What is your interpretation? Page 73. ce.sharif.edu/~b_momeni/ce441/15-crypto-sym.pdf $\endgroup$
    – jongjena
    Commented Nov 4, 2021 at 21:48

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I am using AES-CBC as a hash function which is encrypting a block of length n. The blocks, m = (m1, m2, ..., mn). The IV is one block long and the encryption key is length 128, 192 or 256 bits.

Questions:

  • What is the key? Is it fixed in advance, or is it something secret? BTW: if it's 'something secret', you don't have a standard hash function (where the entire descryption is public; you may have a MAC, but see below).

  • What is the hash output? Is it the entire encrypted message, or is it just the last block.

Here are the possibilities:

  • If the key is fixed in advance, and the hash is the entire encrypted message, then of course you will never have a collision (because you can decrypt and get the original message back - you couldn't do that if there were a collision). Of course, a hash that is as long as the original message isn't very interesting.

  • If the key is fixed in advance, and the hash is the last block, then it is easy to create collisions (and preimages) - all the attacker needs to do to generate a preimage is formulate the message (except for one block), insert the known start state (IV) and final state (the target hash), and work toward the middle - the necessary state of that one unspecified block can easily be found.

  • If the key is unknown and the hash is the last block, this is actually the construction known as CBC-MAC. For fixed length messages, it's a decent message authentication code - however, if the attacker can vary the message length, he can come up with forgeries and collisions.

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