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I have this assignment in which I have to prove that Alice can recover the original plaintext that Bob sent using MQV. The way this goes is:

A trusted party chooses and publishes a (large) prime $p$, an elliptic curve $E$ over $F_p$, and a point $P \in E(F_p)$.

  • Then Alice chooses a secret multiplier $n_A$ and

  • calculates $Q_a = [n_A]P$. $Q_a$ is published.

  • Bob codes the plaintext in 2 integers, $m_1$ and $m_2$, and

  • generates a random integer $k$, which is the key.

  • He then calculates $R = [k]P$, computes $S =(x_s,y_s) = [k]Q_a$

    which makes $c_1 \equiv x_s m_1 \pmod{p}$ and $c_2 \equiv y_s m_2 \pmod{p}$.

  • He sends $(R, c_1, c_2)$ to Alice.

  • Finally, Alice computes

    $$T = (x_t , y_t ) = [n_A]R,$$ $$m_1 \equiv x_t^{−1}c_1 \pmod {p},$$

    and $$m'_2 = y_t^{−1} c_2 \pmod{p}$$

And I have to prove that $(m'_1, m'_2) = (m_1,m_2)$

Any help is appreciated!

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  • $\begingroup$ Welcome to Cryptography.SE. You have dumped your HW, which is not readible. I've converted it to $\LaTeX$ MathJax. Check the edits and show your progress. HW questions are welcomed,however, we only provide some hints... $\endgroup$
    – kelalaka
    Jan 12 at 13:33
  • $\begingroup$ I don't see a hard question here other than the following the obvious. Note that $$[k]Q_a = k([n_a]Q_a) = [k n_A]Q$$ $\endgroup$
    – kelalaka
    Jan 12 at 13:57
  • $\begingroup$ Note that MQV is a key agreement scheme, therefore one must say that prove that Alice and Bob agreed on the same key! $\endgroup$
    – kelalaka
    Jan 12 at 14:18

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