Questions tagged [adversarial-model]
An adversary model formally defines the power of the adversary. It includes specifics whether the adversary is deterministic/randomized, uniform/non-uniform, interactive/non-interactive and how he interacts with the security game.
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How to build a security model
What are the minimal components to build a security model proof for a protocol?
This question might seem trivial, but having read many papers-- from the IEEE, ACM, etc., that talk about a KMP-- I ...
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Explanation of the term "view" for algorithm or adversary
What is the view of an algorithm/adversary? Is view just a term used to describe the output over a set of inputs for a probabilistic algorithm?
For example:
Consider experiment Mac-forgeA,Π (n). ...
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What does the bounded storage model mean?
In the bounded storage model, it assumes the storage of the adversary is bounded or limited, and thus it is possible that we can achieve a kind of cryptography without relying on hardness assumption. ...
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How do adversary models and security types relate [from InfoSec SE]
I have been told to move the question to this forum in order to get a better insight, so here we go:
Reading some questions in this forum I encountered this answer mentioning IND-CPA as a requirement ...
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Automated Security Protocol tool that models algebraic operations
Are there any automated security protocol verification tools that model algebraic operations; specifically addition.
I am familiar with AVISPA and Verifpal, and they are both great and user-friendly ...
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Impossibility of recovering the key of a keyed pseudorandom permutation
I'm currently working on some cryptography homework, but I'm stuck on this particular question.
Let $F$ be a pseudorandom permutation with identical key length and
block length (both equal to the ...
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How does one ensure that a handshake protocol is secure assuming all underlying cryptography used are secure
Suppose one have to design handshake protocol using known secure cryptographic algorithm. The designer of implementer can assume that crypotography is secure but how would they ensure protocol itself ...
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How to provide security against malicious adversary in Ring LWE homomorphic encryption scheme?
I was reading Ring LWE homomorphic encryption scheme referred in http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~zvikab/localpapers/IdealHom.pdf
But this encryption scheme provides security mostly in the semi-...
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Given the block cipher compute max PRF advantage
Hey all I'm having a bit of problem with this question. Not sure how to approach it. Any help will be appreciated :)
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Game-based security notion and hybrid proofs - adversarial randomness
Say we have a game-based definition of security and wish to prove the security of our construction using a series of hybrids. Can we somehow "fix" an adversary that we interact with in one ...
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Cryptographic Voting: Coercion Resistance and Denial of Service
I've been reading up on Coercion Resistance (CR) and one thing stuck out to me. Usually, the methods to achieve CR involve allowing the voters to create an unlimited number of indistinguishable dummy ...
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How to securely implement a deadpool in a PoW blockchain?
Imagine you have a blockchain where the Proof of Work scheme is integer factorization. There is an opcode that takes two integers $N,M$ where it returns true if $M\not\in \{0,1,N\}$ and $N \mod M \...
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Why is a protocol that is secure in the presence of a malicious adversary also secure in the presence of an augmented semi-honest adversary？
Proposition Let π be a protocol that securely computes a functionality f in the presence of malicious adversaries. Then π securely computes f in the presence of augmented semi-honest adversaries.
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Formal proof that the following definitions of perfect secrecy are equivalent
I've seen the following two definitions of perfect secrecy for an encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec).
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Model a dishonest majority controlled by several adversaries in a voting protocol?
In the context of secure multi-party computation protocols, when a dishonest majority is considered, it is assumed the worst case scenario, i.e., all the corrupted parties are controlled by the same ...
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What does it mean exactly that an adversary can control a polynomial number of parties?
I have an intuitive idea of this, but I am not sure if I am formally interpreting it correctly. In the scenario I am considering, each party is identified by a sequence of $n$ bits and I have $2^{n}$ ...
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