Questions tagged [adversarial-model]

An adversary model formally defines the power of the adversary. It includes specifics whether the adversary is deterministic/randomized, uniform/non-uniform, interactive/non-interactive and how he interacts with the security game.

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How to build a security model

What are the minimal components to build a security model proof for a protocol? This question might seem trivial, but having read many papers-- from the IEEE, ACM, etc., that talk about a KMP-- I ...
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Explanation of the term “view” for algorithm or adversary

What is the view of an algorithm/adversary? Is view just a term used to describe the output over a set of inputs for a probabilistic algorithm? For example: Consider experiment Mac-forgeA,Π (n). ...
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How do adversary models and security types relate [from InfoSec SE]

I have been told to move the question to this forum in order to get a better insight, so here we go: Reading some questions in this forum I encountered this answer mentioning IND-CPA as a requirement ...
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Extended Canetti-Krawczyk - Clean Session Definition

In the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model [1] the adversary $\mathcal{M}$ is allowed to make a sequence of queries, eventually performs a $Test(sid)$ query, receives a value $C$ and at some point ...
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How does one ensure that a handshake protocol is secure assuming all underlying cryptography used are secure

Suppose one have to design handshake protocol using known secure cryptographic algorithm. The designer of implementer can assume that crypotography is secure but how would they ensure protocol itself ...
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How to provide security against malicious adversary in Ring LWE homomorphic encryption scheme?

I was reading Ring LWE homomorphic encryption scheme referred in http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~zvikab/localpapers/IdealHom.pdf But this encryption scheme provides security mostly in the semi-...
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Given the block cipher compute max PRF advantage

Hey all I'm having a bit of problem with this question. Not sure how to approach it. Any help will be appreciated :)
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Formal proof that the following definitions of perfect secrecy are equivalent

I've seen the following two definitions of perfect secrecy for an encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec). ...
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Proof by reduction for for digital signature scheme $S_2((sk_0,sk_1), m):=(S(sk_0,m), S(sk_1,m))$

Let $(Gen,S,V)$ be a secure signature scheme (existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack) with message space${\{0,1\}}^n$. Generate two signing/verification key ...
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Model a dishonest majority controlled by several adversaries in a voting protocol?

In the context of secure multi-party computation protocols, when a dishonest majority is considered, it is assumed the worst case scenario, i.e., all the corrupted parties are controlled by the same ...
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What does it mean exactly that an adversary can control a polynomial number of parties?

I have an intuitive idea of this, but I am not sure if I am formally interpreting it correctly. In the scenario I am considering, each party is identified by a sequence of $n$ bits and I have $2^{n}$ ...
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What is the relation between an ideal protocol or functionality and an adversary model?

In the context of the UC framework, what is the relation between an ideal protocol or functionality and an adversary model? Does it make sense to specify the type of adversary an ideal protocol or ...