Questions tagged [attack]

A cryptographic attack tries to theoretically and/or practically attack the security properties of a cipher and/or algorithm.

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What is the largest parameter broken for NTRU?

The original secure parameters for NTRU shown below are from the original HPS98 paper. This is vastly different from the current secure suggested parameters in the NIST PQC round 3 submission. ...
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Who provides prime numbers for cryptographic protocols?

I am currently writing a thesis about different cryptographic protocols like DH-Key exchange, TLS or IKE. Most of them rely on a prime number earlier or later, so for security reasons I wondered if ...
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How to decrypt RSA shared same private exponent? [closed]

There are 4 RSA public-private keys where each has different primes however, they use the same private key $d$. $\text{Pub}_1 = (e_1,n_1)$, $\text{Priv}_1 = (d,n_1)$ $\text{Pub}_2 = (e_2,n_3)$, $\...
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Does Hinek and Lam's Paper prove that Common Modulus Attacks is possible with non-coprime public exponents?

We know that Common Modulus Attacks work with coprime public exponents $(e',s)$ such that $${e_1}s+{e_2}t=\gcd(e_1,e_2)=1$$ I am reading Hinek and Lam's Paper: Common Modulus Attacks on Small Private ...
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Finding the private key for this signature scheme

Assume the signature scheme where $x$ is the private key and the public key $y = g^x \pmod{p}$. The signature works as: Choose $h \in \{0, \dots, p-2 \}$ s.t.: $\mathcal{H}(m) + x + h \equiv 0 \pmod{...
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Attacks on LWE when q is a power of 2

I am working on an LWE instance where q is a power of 2 and I'm wondering if there is any literature about attacks in this context, especially if there are any attacks which work significantly better. ...
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Is there a problem with this specific RSA protocol?

So a protocol uses two random primes $P$ and $Q$ with the equivalent bit length of around 2048 bits, multiplies to form $N$. The encryption function in detail is: $m^e \bmod\ N$ $(\text{512-bit-random-...
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How to attack Oblivious Transfer from a malicious sender that can deviate from the protocol

I am looking at at the $1–2 \space \text{oblivious transfer}$ that is described here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oblivious_transfer#:~:text=In%20cryptography%2C%20an%20oblivious%20transfer,Rabin. I ...
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Complete crypto attack explanation or hierarchy including statistical attack, entropy attack, correlation attack, differential attack?

How exactly statistical attack(resistancy tested using histogram analysis), entropy attack(resistancy tested using entropy information), correlation attack(resistancy tested using correlation ...
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Known attacks against ECC in case many multiples are known?

Suppose there's a secret value x, an elliptic curve with the (public) generator G, and a sequence of secret values ...
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Can I alter encrypted data without decrypting it?

I didn't find a direct solution for it. Can I modify encrypted data without accessing it? If there is an example, I would appreciate it.
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AES 5 and 6 round SQUARE Attack

SQUARE attack on AES128 requires a single delta set for 4-round variant, or I assume single delta set is enough since keyspace is reduced to few keys which can be easily brute-forced. However, as we ...
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On the current memory retain limits for the coldboot attack (2020)

ColdBoot attack is introduced by Halderman et. al in 2009 Lest we remember: cold-boot attacks on encryption keys In their articles, they represent experimented that We found that the dimensions of ...
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Are there any mutual-distance bounding protocols in RFID context?

Distance-bounding algorithms are a classical solution for the Relay Attack, wherein a verifier can determine an upper bound on its distance from the prover. However, recent literature is discussing ...
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Boomerang attack - looking for simply explanation

Can someone explain to me in a simple way how it works? I know what differential cryptoanalysis is, but my knowledge is rather amateur. Nevertheless, reading the post on Wikipedia:Boomerang Attack I ...
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Is it possible to acquire the next keystream of Salsa20? (If you know part of the keystream)

When you know the Salsa20's keystream, how do you know the next keystream? In other words, can I infer the next keystream when I don't know the Key and IV of Salsa20, but the keystream is ...
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Which RSA keys are actually attacked In practice?

I understand that it is important to check how hard it is to attack RSA keys, but I assume at some key size attackers would not even try. Real attacks are carried out by exploiting mistakes in the ...
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Security of a custom AES-based attack model

Provided that: $AES(plaintext, key)$ is the standard AES block cipher for a 128 bits block. $\oplus$ is the standard XOR operation. $K$ is a constant 128 bits pseudorandom value, which is used as the ...
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Breaking vulnerable ElGamal encryption

In a ctf, I encountered this problem: ...
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May an adversary be fooled by a random-looking input that in reality is fixed?

I want to prove the EUF-CMA-security of a signature scheme. It is a variation on an established scheme, therefore I would ideally like to reduce the new-scheme-security to the old-scheme-security. the ...
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61 views

When attacking keyed algorithms, how is it known when the output is correct?

I've been reading a little bit about cryptanalysis, and I'm wondering how attacking algorithms that work on keys is performed. It's obvious how algorithms like MD5 are attacked, in pseudocode: ...
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128 views

Cracking RSA with small plaintext

I read a CTF writeup about cracking 4 primes RSA numbers from here: Given $p, q, r,$ and $p+q+r$ are prime numbers. The challenge encrypts the flag with a modulus $N=(p∗q∗r)∗(p+q+r)$ and gives the ...
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The aftermath and considerations of the new record of 30750-Bit Binary Field Discrete Logarithm - 2020

Granger et al. recently published a paper about breaking a record for discrete logarithm on the Binary field Computation of a 30 750-Bit Binary Field Discrete Logarithm, Robert Granger and Thorsten ...
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What is the ChainOfFools/CurveBall Attack on ECDSA on Windows 10 CryptoAPI

What is the ChainOfFools/CurveBall Attack on ECDSA on Windows 10 CryptoAPI (Crypt32.dll) Could someone provide details?
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Understanding birthday attacks on 256 bit hashing and 512 bit hashing [duplicate]

Does it make a difference against birthday attacks if the algorithm that I am using is 512 bit hashing?
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Check linear and differential cryptanalysis of a new block cipher [duplicate]

I am developing a new block cipher primitive. I would like to test its robustness against attacks of linear and differential cryptanalysis. Is there a tool to evaluate this using only plaintext and ...
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Iterations of pollards kangaroo attack on elliptic curves

I want to understand the Pollard kangaroo attack on elliptic curves. I found this Pollard's kangaroo attack on Elliptic Curve Groups Q/A pretty helpful, but not complete. The posts provides a pretty ...
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MOV-attack on ecc: Time complexity and example

There already is this pretty big post about the MOV-attack. It states, that the discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves can be transformed to a discrete logarithm problem over a finite field. ...
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Pollard Rho Optimization

One of the most important attacks on Elliptic Curve cryptography is Pollard's Rho method. The effect on security can be seen on SafeCurves. This attack is pretty old and there has been a bunch of ...
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Curve25519 Attacks and Security

Curve25519 is a pretty secure way to exchange a key. In the original Paper and on SafeCurves a lot of attacks and security aspects are mentioned: Attacks: Brute force: This one is theoretically ...
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Pohlig Hellman and small subgroup attacks

While studying Curve25519 I read about the small subgroup attack in chapter 3. So far i know, that you need a point with a small subgroup to do such an attack. Curve25519 has a basepoint with prime ...
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Proof by reduction for for digital signature scheme $S_2((sk_0,sk_1), m):=(S(sk_0,m), S(sk_1,m))$

Let $(Gen,S,V)$ be a secure signature scheme (existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack) with message space${\{0,1\}}^n$. Generate two signing/verification key ...
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Adversary for attack on one variant of ElGamal

I came by the following question: Consider the following variant of ElGamal encryption. Let $p= 2q+ 1$, let $G$ be the group of squares modulo $p$ so $G$ is a subgroup of $Z_p^*$ of order $q$, and ...
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Which cryptographic attacks can AES 128-bit withstand?

Most of the articles and forums are stating that the Brute Force attack can test the strength of an encryption algorithm. However, I am looking for those attacks that AES can withstand for the testing ...
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How to solve high exponent attack for same message in RSA

I know Håstad's broadcast attack when e = 3, but what if e = getPrime(randint(350))?
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Can we defends against RSA Timing attack when we use java.math.BigInteger.modPow?

I think that Montgomery and sliding window techniques are applied within java.math.BigInteger.modPow (and more specifically ...
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Attack against $\operatorname{DESA}_{k,k_1} (x) \underset{\text{def}}= \operatorname{DES}_k(x)⊕k_1$

Problem 5.16 in this pdf, from the book: Christof Paar, Jan Pelzl, Understanding Cryptography 5.16. This is your chance to break a cryptosystem. As we know by now, cryptography is a tricky business. ...
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475 views

Why does the Bombe not consider the Ringstellung when determining stecker pairs?

I am doing research on the Bombe Machine, and I read that when the Bombe tries to find the stecker (plugboard) partners of letters, it only needs to use the rotor types and arrangement and also the "...
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Why are the indicator drums of a Bombe machine labelled from A to Z clockwise?

I am researching the Bombe Machine, having just completed a project on the Enigma Machine. I visited The Rutherford Journal - The Turing Bombe, and it claimed that The scales on the three ...
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Does having a hash of a password jeopardize the security of plaintext that was encrypted with that password?

A malicious actor wants to decrypt ciphertext that was encrypted with a password. He also possesses the hash (bcrypt/PBKDF2) of that password. Does he have any significant practical advantage in ...
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Is Joux's multicollision attack applicable for truncated SHA256?

Joux presents an elegant way to generate k-way multi-collisions with about as much effort as generating a single collision: https://www.iacr.org/archive/crypto2004/31520306/multicollisions.pdf ...
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380 views

XOR cipher with fixed key and known relation among plaintexts

I have three messages, each known to be XOR-encoded, with the same key used for each message of this XOR cipher. Encoded message 1: $e_1\,=\,00100111010$ Encoded message 2: $e_2\,=\,01001110110$ ...
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62 views

Inside attack (attack from participants) in secret sharing

I have considered a $(t,n)$ secret sharing scheme with $n$ secret, say $a1,a2....an$. It's third party secure, but it has inside adversaries. While reconstructing secrets, a group of $t$ qualified ...
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171 views

Secret sharing scheme WITHOUT Shamir Secrete Sharing

I am planning to use the following XOR scheme to divide a secret into only 2 shares (I do not want to use Shamir Secret Sharing for different reasons that are beyond the scope of this post). Here's ...
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1answer
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Can MFA codes be predicted if you know what their values were at a previous time?

I use an app on my phone that, after scanning a QR code on a website, gives me 6-digit codes which change every 30 seconds. These codes can be used for Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) on some ...
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Can someone explain the timing attack on RSA with Montgomery multiplication?

I have read several articles on the temporal attack against Montgomery multiplication to speedup RSA computations. However, I do not quite get the principle. I understood that there is a additional ...
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167 views

Breaking ciphertext using a quantum computer when the public key is not available

As we know about Shor's algorithm on quantum computers it is possible to crack RSA / ECC easily if we have enough qubits. Is it possible to crack RSA / ECC on a quantum computer if we only have ...
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161 views

Find prime $p$ such that $a^x\equiv b\pmod p$ for many $x\in[1,p)$

Given haphazard large integers $a$ and $b$ (like few thousand bits), can we efficiently find (and how) some integer triplet $(p,x,k)$ with $p$ a large prime (like a thousand bits) $a^x\equiv b\pmod p$...
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is there an effective attack against rsa by knowing the coefficient $u$ of the private key? [duplicate]

consider that an attacker has the public key $(n, e)$, where $n$ is $1024$ bits long, the $32$ largest bits of $p$ (where $n = p \cdot q$), as well as $u = p^{-1} \pmod q$. Is there an attack that ...
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327 views

Things already known to adversary before planning an attack

This is a very basic and practical question. Since I started reading cryptography recently, these things keep bugging me. What are the things that an adversary is usually aware of before planning an ...

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