Questions tagged [attack]

A cryptographic attack tries to theoretically and/or practically attack the security properties of a cipher and/or algorithm.

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What happens if the Edwards curve isn't quadratic twist secure?

On this webpage, Daniel Bernstein offers that the curve must be quadratic twisted secure. This means that if the curve has $\#E$ points on $Z_p$ where $\#E=p+1-t$, then the quadratic twist curve has $\...
Mahdi Mahdavi's user avatar
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1 answer
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Can you please explain how Manger's attack against RSA OAEP works?

I searched but found nothing except the original paper, and I can't wrap my head around it. Can you help me by giving an overview and then if possible, a short explanation of the algo?
arka's user avatar
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Is generalized birthday attack only suitable for the problem with multiple solutions?

In David Wagner's article A Generalized Birthday Problem, he said and I quote: Our algorithm works only when one can extend the size of the lists freely, i.e, in the special case where there are ...
Laura's user avatar
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3 votes
2 answers
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So is AES-256 more secure or less secure than AES-128 after all?

It seems there are attacks that work more effectively on AES-256 than AES-128, which makes it less secure in some cases. But the bigger key size should add some safety margin on the other hand, for ...
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Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM)

If a company uses Domain Keys Identified Mail ("sender adds a special signature which includes author name / date signed by RSA Private Key. Receiver verifies the signature by looking up the ...
James's user avatar
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Crack AES encryption via passphrase dictionary attack?

How easy would it be to crack a AES-256 encrypted file, that is protected by a passphrase? I understand that the trying to brute force a AES-256 encryption key would be on the unfeasible side, even ...
Kelthar's user avatar
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30 votes
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How was this 2048 bit number factored so fast?

I'm working on a CTF. The challenge is to get the contents of an encrypted message given the ciphertext and the 2048-bit RSA public key. I did finally get the flag after a few hours, but I'm still not ...
rainbowkitty227's user avatar
2 votes
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Howgrave-Graham lattice attack on NTRU

I am lookin for a good example to illustrate this attack on NTRU using low parameters but I failed to do that, The attack consist to use LLL reduction on A basis of NTRU Lattice, let us use the column ...
Don Freecs's user avatar
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1 answer
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How to use sagemath to find nonlinear invariants of S-box?

I read a paper about a nonlinear invariant attack that is "Nonlinear Invariant Attack: Practical Attack on Full SCREAM, iSCREAM, and Midori64" And I've found a website of sagemath : https://...
Huy By's user avatar
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Vulnerability in DES3 when key can be chosen

In the question there are two functions encrypt basically does IV ⨁ DES3(P⨁IV) and encrypt_flag just encrypts the flag after being padded into a multiple of 8. IV is a random 8 byte number which is ...
Michael Blane's user avatar
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The Primal and Dual attack security estimates in Kyber round 3 specification

In Kyber round 3 specification, the table 4 gave the security estimates of Primal and Dual attack with respect to Kyber 512, 768 and 1024 (see the figure below). However, using the python script given ...
Shara's user avatar
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Quadratic Equations to Describe SBox

I am using a 8 bit Sbox having 16 entries with a lookup table of 4x4 in cryptographic algorithm. Sbox is constructed on subgroup of galois field 2^8. I want to calculate number of quadratic equations ...
Dania's user avatar
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1 answer
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Choosing rings for PLWE

In [ELOS15], the authors give an attack on RLWE, and claim that "the hardness of Ring-LWE is... dependent on special properties of the number field" chosen; whereas, responding to prior ...
a196884's user avatar
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7 votes
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Is there a complete summarized list of attacks on Diffie-Hellman?

Is there a complete summarized list of attacks on Diffie-Hellman? For RSA, there is this paper by Boneh, so I was wondering whether there is such a list for attacks on DHKE. I have been looking ...
Michael Blane's user avatar
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Is it possible to alter the plaintext message without altering the ciphertext?

Is it possible to alter the contents of a plaintext message without altering the ciphertext? Altering the private key is allowed to accomplish this. If the answer is yes, how would I go about in doing ...
Jeff's user avatar
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Dishonest verifier running a concurrent zero-knowledge protocol

Suppose Alice and Bob are engaged in the graph 3-colorability Zero-knowledge protocol in which Alice permutes a coloring $\varphi:V\rightarrow \{1,2,3\}$ for a graph $G(V,E)$, and then sends a ...
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Examples of Weak Cryptography being exploited in the wild by cybercriminals?

As a theorist, I often motivate the need for strong cryptography via simplistic methods, such as "If this did not exist, your online bank transactions would be vulnerable". This is of course ...
Mark's user avatar
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Why is $\phi(N) = (p^2 -1) (q^2 - 1)$ here?

I was reading a paper on attacks on RSA variants, and the paper equates $\phi(N) = (p^2-1)(q^2-1)$. Before, I have always seen $\phi(N) = (p-1)(q-1)$ and don't understand why it is different here. I ...
Eeshan Zele's user avatar
1 vote
2 answers
494 views

Is it possible to unscramble a scrambled ed25519 SSH key?

Let's say I generate an ed25519 SSH key with ssh-keygen -t ed25519. Then I take the private key file and randomly scramble the order of base64 encoded characters. ...
slw's user avatar
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Is there any correlation in between two AES with a key differ only by one bit? (ECB mode)

Given two AES (128bit, ECB mode) with almost equal keys $k_1,k_2$: 127 of the 128 key bits are equal. Is there any correlation in between the ciphers they build? $$AES_1(m_i) = c_i$$ $$AES_2(m_i) = ...
J. Doe's user avatar
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1 answer
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basic question regarding two-time pad attack

Dan Boneh's Crypto 1 Course includes a lesson on stream ciphers with the following slide: He asks the question: And the answer he gives is $m \oplus p$, which is why this is insecure. But I don't ...
David J.'s user avatar
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3 votes
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In which case number field sieve/index calculus is faster for solving discrete logarithm?

Given the normal discrete logarithm problem: $$a = b^c \mod{P}$$ with prime $P$ and numbers $a,b,c$ For which kind of $P,b$ the NFS/IC algorithm is faster than Baby-Step/Giant-Step+ Pollard's Rho ($\...
J. Doe's user avatar
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What is the largest parameter broken for NTRU?

The original secure parameters for NTRU shown below are from the original HPS98 paper. This is vastly different from the current secure suggested parameters in the NIST PQC round 3 submission. ...
evernal's user avatar
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2 answers
326 views

Who provides prime numbers for cryptographic protocols?

I am currently writing a thesis about different cryptographic protocols like DH-Key exchange, TLS or IKE. Most of them rely on a prime number earlier or later, so for security reasons I wondered if ...
Greybound's user avatar
2 votes
1 answer
221 views

Does Hinek and Lam's Paper prove that Common Modulus Attacks is possible with non-coprime public exponents?

We know that Common Modulus Attacks work with coprime public exponents $(e',s)$ such that $${e_1}s+{e_2}t=\gcd(e_1,e_2)=1$$ I am reading Hinek and Lam's Paper: Common Modulus Attacks on Small Private ...
Zixi Sean's user avatar
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1 answer
119 views

Finding the private key for this signature scheme

Assume the signature scheme where $x$ is the private key and the public key $y = g^x \pmod{p}$. The signature works as: Choose $h \in \{0, \dots, p-2 \}$ s.t.: $\mathcal{H}(m) + x + h \equiv 0 \pmod{...
Paris's user avatar
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Attacks on LWE when q is a power of 2

I am working on an LWE instance where q is a power of 2 and I'm wondering if there is any literature about attacks in this context, especially if there are any attacks which work significantly better. ...
Partha's user avatar
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Is there a problem with this specific RSA protocol?

So a protocol uses two random primes $P$ and $Q$ with the equivalent bit length of around 2048 bits, multiplies to form $N$. The encryption function in detail is: $m^e \bmod\ N$ $(\text{512-bit-random-...
Adeel Malik's user avatar
2 votes
1 answer
180 views

How to attack Oblivious Transfer from a malicious sender that can deviate from the protocol

I am looking at at the $1–2 \space \text{oblivious transfer}$ that is described here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oblivious_transfer#:~:text=In%20cryptography%2C%20an%20oblivious%20transfer,Rabin. I ...
Gabi G's user avatar
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5 votes
0 answers
1k views

Can I alter encrypted data without decrypting it? [duplicate]

I didn't find a direct solution for it. Can I modify encrypted data without accessing it? If there is an example, I would appreciate it.
user5520049's user avatar
1 vote
1 answer
244 views

AES 5 and 6 round SQUARE Attack

SQUARE attack on AES128 requires a single delta set for 4-round variant, or I assume single delta set is enough since keyspace is reduced to few keys which can be easily brute-forced. However, as we ...
Ahmet Sakal's user avatar
4 votes
0 answers
71 views

On the current memory retain limits for the coldboot attack (2020)

ColdBoot attack is introduced by Halderman et. al in 2009 Lest we remember: cold-boot attacks on encryption keys In their articles, they represent experimented that We found that the dimensions of ...
kelalaka's user avatar
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1 vote
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26 views

Are there any mutual-distance bounding protocols in RFID context?

Distance-bounding algorithms are a classical solution for the Relay Attack, wherein a verifier can determine an upper bound on its distance from the prover. However, recent literature is discussing ...
OrangeJusticeV's user avatar
1 vote
1 answer
412 views

Is it possible to acquire the next keystream of Salsa20? (If you know part of the keystream)

When you know the Salsa20's keystream, how do you know the next keystream? In other words, can I infer the next keystream when I don't know the Key and IV of Salsa20, but the keystream is ...
YGK's user avatar
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1 vote
1 answer
157 views

Which RSA keys are actually attacked In practice?

I understand that it is important to check how hard it is to attack RSA keys, but I assume at some key size attackers would not even try. Real attacks are carried out by exploiting mistakes in the ...
gnasher729's user avatar
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0 votes
1 answer
69 views

Security of a custom AES-based attack model

Provided that: $AES(plaintext, key)$ is the standard AES block cipher for a 128 bits block. $\oplus$ is the standard XOR operation. $K$ is a constant 128 bits pseudorandom value, which is used as the ...
n1ce's user avatar
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1 vote
0 answers
385 views

Breaking vulnerable ElGamal encryption

In a ctf, I encountered this problem: ...
Ketan Chaturvedi's user avatar
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1 answer
79 views

May an adversary be fooled by a random-looking input that in reality is fixed?

I want to prove the EUF-CMA-security of a signature scheme. It is a variation on an established scheme, therefore I would ideally like to reduce the new-scheme-security to the old-scheme-security. the ...
phi.nm's user avatar
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1 vote
1 answer
107 views

When attacking keyed algorithms, how is it known when the output is correct?

I've been reading a little bit about cryptanalysis, and I'm wondering how attacking algorithms that work on keys is performed. It's obvious how algorithms like MD5 are attacked, in pseudocode: ...
tira's user avatar
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1 vote
1 answer
373 views

Cracking RSA with small plaintext

I read a CTF writeup about cracking 4 primes RSA numbers from here: Given $p, q, r,$ and $p+q+r$ are prime numbers. The challenge encrypts the flag with a modulus $N=(p∗q∗r)∗(p+q+r)$ and gives the ...
haxerl's user avatar
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18 votes
0 answers
481 views

The aftermath and considerations of the new record of 30750-Bit Binary Field Discrete Logarithm - 2020

Granger et al. recently published a paper about breaking a record for discrete logarithm on the Binary field Computation of a 30 750-Bit Binary Field Discrete Logarithm, Robert Granger and Thorsten ...
kelalaka's user avatar
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6 votes
1 answer
536 views

What is the ChainOfFools/CurveBall Attack on ECDSA on Windows 10 CryptoAPI

What is the ChainOfFools/CurveBall Attack on ECDSA on Windows 10 CryptoAPI (Crypt32.dll) Could someone provide details?
kelalaka's user avatar
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0 votes
0 answers
326 views

Understanding birthday attacks on 256 bit hashing and 512 bit hashing [duplicate]

Does it make a difference against birthday attacks if the algorithm that I am using is 512 bit hashing?
Marko Peterson's user avatar
6 votes
1 answer
980 views

Iterations of pollards kangaroo attack on elliptic curves

I want to understand the Pollard kangaroo attack on elliptic curves. I found this Pollard's kangaroo attack on Elliptic Curve Groups Q/A pretty helpful, but not complete. The posts provides a pretty ...
Titanlord's user avatar
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2 votes
0 answers
696 views

MOV-attack on ecc: Time complexity and example

There already is this pretty big post about the MOV-attack. It states, that the discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves can be transformed to a discrete logarithm problem over a finite field. ...
Titanlord's user avatar
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3 votes
0 answers
220 views

Pollard Rho Optimization

One of the most important attacks on Elliptic Curve cryptography is Pollard's Rho method. The effect on security can be seen on SafeCurves. This attack is pretty old and there has been a bunch of ...
Titanlord's user avatar
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3 votes
0 answers
646 views

Curve25519 Attacks and Security

Curve25519 is a pretty secure way to exchange a key. In the original Paper and on SafeCurves a lot of attacks and security aspects are mentioned: Attacks: Brute force: This one is theoretically ...
Titanlord's user avatar
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2 votes
1 answer
2k views

Pohlig Hellman and small subgroup attacks

While studying Curve25519 I read about the small subgroup attack in chapter 3. So far i know, that you need a point with a small subgroup to do such an attack. Curve25519 has a basepoint with prime ...
Titanlord's user avatar
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0 votes
1 answer
187 views

Proof by reduction for for digital signature scheme $S_2((sk_0,sk_1), m):=(S(sk_0,m), S(sk_1,m))$

Let $(Gen,S,V)$ be a secure signature scheme (existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack) with message space${\{0,1\}}^n$. Generate two signing/verification key ...
mike's user avatar
  • 41
1 vote
2 answers
655 views

Adversary for attack on one variant of ElGamal

I came by the following question: Consider the following variant of ElGamal encryption. Let $p= 2q+ 1$, let $G$ be the group of squares modulo $p$ so $G$ is a subgroup of $Z_p^*$ of order $q$, and ...
mike's user avatar
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