Questions tagged [known-plaintext-attack]

The attacker knows at least one sample of both the plain text and the cipher text.

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Advantages of AES vs XOR on a plain text file

Currently, I am using AES-GCM to encode and decode a plain text file. The key is derived from a plain text password using PBKDF2 and a random salt with SHA-256. However, I have been thinking and came ...
6 votes
1 answer
236 views

A modern rotor machine, could it be any safe?

I wonder if a rotor machine similar to enigma can be considered secure by today's standards under four conditions: A rotor machine which consists of 50 rotors picked out of a set of 100. A rotor ...
1 vote
2 answers
275 views

Encrypting random IV in CTR mode (no nonce!)

Use of plain random-IV's in CTR mode, without any special "nonces/counters" (or any "dedicated" bits!), can lead to problems with "partial overlaps", whereby attackers ...
5 votes
1 answer
280 views

How to recover ring settings for the slow and the middle rotors on Enigma Checking Machine?

Summary: The operation of the Enigma Bombe is well documented. I manage to use it and a candidate checking machine to recover the plugboard pairs and the ring setting for the fast rotor. I struggle to ...
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1 answer
41 views

Using plaintext + ciphertext combination as substitute for authentication/signature in elliptic curve cryptography

I'm working on a system where I need to sign some data using an ECC private key and share the data and signature over a BLE ADV packet. Since an ADV packet is limited in space, I can't use a full ...
2 votes
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36 views

How many ciphertexts should attacker intercepts if he only knows the first 3 bytes of plaintext of each one?

Consider a system in which DES is used to encrypt messages in which the first three plaintext Bytes are known by the attacker. How many encrypted messages is it necessary to intercept in order to be ...
1 vote
1 answer
105 views

DES attack with known partial plaintext

Consider a system where DES is used to encrypt HTTP GET requests. The first three bytes correspond to the character sequence "GET". How many encrypted messages is it necessary to intercept ...
6 votes
2 answers
363 views

What were Alan Turing and their team searching before doing KPA in the movie "The imitation game"?

I just watched the movie "The imitation game" (2014) which is based on Alan Turing's biography. At some point in the movie the machine built by Turing wasn't fast enough to decrypt the ...
1 vote
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Non-uniform plaintext distribution -- AES attack

Are their any attacks on AES (any mode) in which before the attack is mounted, the adversary is aware that the input distribution is non-uniform? Most of the work assume that the plaintext is ...
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2 answers
49 views

Attack on AES/DES [duplicate]

Can we devise an attack on AES or DES (ECB mode) if we know just the distribution for the plaintext? For example, it is a English plain text -- we know what that would look like and the relative ...
2 votes
0 answers
52 views

1st round attack on rc4

I'm trying to implement the 1st round attack on RC4 stream cipher according to Attacks on the RC4 stream cipher. For now I am interested in section 4.2 Attack on other key bytes. It works really fine ...
1 vote
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124 views

AES-CBC-MAC forgery attack

I have a CBC-MAC scheme using AES as the block cipher (T=H_K1(M)), which gives me a tag and a stream cipher using another key and a nonce, which gives me a cryptotext (C=E_K2(N,M)). So my question is ...
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1 answer
365 views

Why is ECB mode unsafe if the key is kept secret?

this is my first post so I apologise if the formatting of my post isn't perfect. I should start off by saying that this post is not for any malicious intent, rather for curiosity and understanding AES ...
1 vote
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Determining the initial positions of Engima's rotors

We want to perform a known plaintext attack on the enigma M3, the goal is to reach the initial settings of the 3 rotors. I tried to bruteforce those values since I know the plaintext, ciphertext, ...
2 votes
1 answer
115 views

Clarification on expected number of plaintext, ciphertext pairs needed to identify AES keys

I'm aware of the many questions on this topic, but I'm still not sure what went wrong with my reasoning here below. I'm assuming use of AES with key size $2^{256}$ and messages of size $2^{128}$, ...
1 vote
1 answer
114 views

Clarification regarding Rabin Cryptosystem being CPA (Chosen Plaintext Attack) secure

Do I understand correctly that the textbook Rabin encryption scheme, where there is no random padding (as is also required in RSA for it to be CPA secure), is not CPA secure? (it is deterministic ...
3 votes
1 answer
753 views

AES with a different implementation of byte substitution step

I have tried to answer this question for quite some time now. But a complete intuitive understanding still eludes me: suggested a new implementation for AES: The byte substitution step will be ...
1 vote
1 answer
262 views

AES-128-CFB repeated IV and KPA

I'm doing reverse-engineering a product and identified a critical issue with it. The work is done and the developer was notified, but for my own personal curiosity, I'd like to learn how to exploit it ...
12 votes
1 answer
5k views

Sending KCV (key check value) with cipher text

I was wondering why it is not more common to send the KCV of a secret key together with the cipher text. I see many systems that send cipher text and properly prepend the IV to e.g. a CBC mode ...
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Attack against stream cipher (LFSR with ASCII)

I'm reading Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl. In chapter 2 (Stream Ciphers) there's a question that goes like this: Assume we have a stream cipher whose period is quite short....
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1 answer
112 views

Do attackers need to know what ciphers are being used when conducting ciphertext-only, known plaintext, chosen plaintext, and chosen ciphertext attack

I am trying to understand the basic ingredients needed to conduct various types of cryptanalytical attacks. For instance, I understand that for Ciphertext-Only Attacks (COA) an attacker only has ...
1 vote
1 answer
660 views

Is AES GCM without GMAC vulnerable against known plaintext attack?

Is AES GCM without GMAC vulnerable against bit-flip attacks? Let's assume the plaintext is known for some reason (e.g. it can be guessed). In my opinion, I can flip bits in the ciphered blocks and can ...
5 votes
2 answers
30k views

How to find the keyword of the Playfair cipher, given the plaintext and the ciphertext?

I know how the Playfair cipher works. I would like to know how to find the keyword of the Playfair cipher, given some ciphertext and the corresponding plaintext. For example: encrypted: ...
32 votes
1 answer
9k views

What do the signature security abbreviations like EUF-CMA mean?

From time to time, one stumbles across formal security definitions. This includes security definitions for signature schemes. The most common ones are the *UF-* ...
1 vote
1 answer
635 views

KPA-Security definition

In cryptography there are 4 basic attack classifications: Ciphertext-Only Attack Known-Plaintext Attack Chosen-Plaintext Attack Chosen-Ciphertext Attack In Katz & Lindell's textbook (2nd edition)...
7 votes
3 answers
3k views

Is the ChaCha20 block function reversible using known plaintext?

I've been recently implementing the chacha20 stream cipher with Poly1305. As the core operations which make up the Quarter Round of chacha20 (ARX - Addition Rotation Xor) are indeed reversible, does ...
3 votes
1 answer
556 views

Is Paillier secure from known plaintext attack for single character message?

Assuming I have three messages m1,m2,m3 where m1=m2=m3=1 and I compute c1,c2 and c3. Does that mean that c1=c2=c3 in cipher-text from ? If not, how many times can I encrypt a message m=1 and still ...
1 vote
1 answer
47 views

Is it allowable to put a restriction on the length of the plaintext used in the known-plaintext attack?

The definition of the known-plaintext attack: I have a plaintext and I can encrypt it to have its ciphertext, then I use this pair to break the cipher. The question: The only thing I further assume is ...
0 votes
1 answer
649 views

Recognizing and decrypting custom cipher with known plaintext and ciphertext

I've been trying to reconstruct an encryption algorithm that produces a known ciphertext from a know plaintext. I have done some analysis: the algorithm operates on single bytes a plain text can be ...
11 votes
4 answers
2k views

One round of AES-128

Maybe it’s a silly question, I’m interested in the best known/chosen plaintext attack on only one round of AES-128. More specifically, what is the smallest number of known/chosen plaintext/ciphertext ...
4 votes
1 answer
549 views

Number of plaintext–ciphertext pairs needed to rule out false keys with a reasonable likelihood in AES

I am new to cryptography and I've got the following question from Understanding Cryptography: Imagine that aliens — rather than abducting earthlings and performing strange experiments on them — drop a ...
3 votes
2 answers
1k views

JSON AES-128: Security against known plaintext attack

I have a system where I am transmitting JSON messages securely (using for example AES-128), where each message has the same format. For example: ...
1 vote
2 answers
515 views

Known Plaintext attacks using standard greetings etc

In all modern ciphers, even if one bit of input changes, then half of the output will change because of diffusion. Considering this, how exactly will knowing standard salutations, etc. ("Hello ...
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275 views

Known Plain Text Attack DES-OFB on Crack.sh

I am trying to do a known plaintext attack on DES-OFB through crack.sh. I have been having trouble lately. I keep getting blank text file back with no keys returned. Does anybody know if DES-OFB is ...
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Known plaintext attack on AES with CBC

Assume I have a plaintext and a ciphertext, encrypted using some key and AES with CBC mode. I don't have a service, that I can send something to, so I can't use the Padding Oracle attack. Are there ...
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36 views

How to falsify RSA signature with known message [duplicate]

I have a question about the RSA signature. Let's say Alice has $(d,n)$ as the private key and $(e,n)$ as the public key. In order to sign a message $m$, Alice computes $y = m^d \bmod n$ and sends $(m,...
3 votes
1 answer
260 views

Combining CTR and ECB modes to prevent attacks

In Reusing AES-CTR Keys and IVs for File Encryption, the OP was asking about a composite encryption scheme $$C_i = E_K\left(P_i \oplus E_K\left(IV + i\right)\right)$$ which is basically just a CTR ...
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1 answer
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Consequences of AES-GCM always encrypting the same plaintext

I am analysing an authentication protocol. In this protocol AES-GCM is used to encrypt part of the messages. Regarding the authentication protocol, I made the following observations: The plaintext ...
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493 views

How to perform a known plaintext attack?

I have got the following documents: (1) The plaintext (2) The ciphertext (3) The python program used to encrypt/decrypt the text My goal is to find the key that was used to encrypt the plaintext into ...
3 votes
1 answer
167 views

How much information do I leak if I upload multiple ciphertexts with cleartext overlaps?

Suppose that $t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_n$ are my clear texts. Suppose that for any $(i,j) \in \{1,2,\ldots,n\}^2$, $t_i$ and $t_j$ only differ in, say, the 1st $m$-many characters. Finally, suppose that I ...
0 votes
1 answer
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Safety of encryption when knowing part of the content [duplicate]

I want to encrypt a JSON file while exposing its interface (the name of the object fields) in clear text. Since this exposes part of the content of the file, my guess is that an attacker could use ...
2 votes
2 answers
129 views

Construction of a "simple", nothing-up-my-sleeves, provably KPA resistant symmetric cipher

Why is AES secure? Apparently there is no answer - Why is AES resistant to known-plaintext attacks?. With this in mind, one would obviously want a cipher that is mathematically provable to be ...
6 votes
1 answer
299 views

On CPA & KPA security of $\boxplus$-Feistel

I am interested to identify the effect of replacing $\oplus$ with $\boxplus$ on basic balanced Feistel structures over $r$-rounds. Given: $F_\boxplus[L,R]= [S,T] = [R,L \boxplus f(R)]$ where $f$ is a ...
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RNG to hide some bits

Suppose I have a sequence of bits of length M. I need to hide N out of M bits (hiding means forcing them to be 0) using RNG with a key. How I can relate the output of RNG to the number and positions ...
1 vote
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Memory required for known plaintext attack on general block cipher

Consider a block cipher on binary strings of length $k$ and keys which can be any binary string of length $n$. With $k2^n+k$ memory we can store all key/ciphertext pairs for a fixed plaintext and this ...
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2 answers
82 views

would this be classed as a cipher text attack?

Say i'm given a cipher text to decrypt, however i also have access to a server that performed the encryption; where i could enter any plaintext and observe the result of encryption. would it be ...
2 votes
1 answer
316 views

Is it possible to perform CPA(Correlation Power Analysis) when attacker has only specific round's waveform?

I read Quite a lot document about breaking AES using CPA. But most of them, assuming that attacker has the first or last round of the waveform(trace) and exploit SubBytes. My question is if the AES-...
1 vote
1 answer
55 views

Is it safe to distribute different portions of the same data encrypted with different AES keys?

Assume I have a block of data consisting of three segments A, B and C. With "segments" I mean a particular section of a bit stream, so if the whole binary data was simply ...
2 votes
1 answer
1k views

How does one conduct a known-plaintext attack on an algorithm?

My question is two-fold: Say I am given a total black box and I have n number of plaintexts as inputs that map directly to $n$-number of ciphertexts as outputs. This is all I know, and I do not have ...
3 votes
1 answer
512 views

How to secure Elliptic Curve ElGamal encryption against known plaintext attacks?

If I have an encoding function $f(x)$ that maps a message $m$ to a point $P$ on a suitable Elliptic Curve $E$ . If I have the public key $Q$ of my recepient then I can encrypt the message as follows: ...