Questions tagged [libsodium]
"The sodium crypto library". A cryptographic multi-language-library with support for many modern cryptographic primitives, that is a fork of the NaCl library. The library focuses on providing easy-to-use cryptographic primitives.
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questions with no upvoted or accepted answers
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506 views
Nonce reuse resistance
I read this article and I think the approach outlined there is very interesting for one of our use case.
We use ChaCha20 Poly1305 (via Sodium ...
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1answer
480 views
Standard serialization format for libsodium-based messages
Does anyone know of a standardized serialization format which can be (or already is) widely used for encrypted messages? For a variety of reasons (mostly complexity, age and poor support across a lot ...
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0answers
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Negotiating a session key, when only one public-key is exchanged via QR Code
Question
I want to create a secure channel between a server and a client. It is only important that the client can verify the identity of the server, not the other way around.
In my special case, an ...
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0answers
115 views
P2P Website/Database Encryption Process
Sorry if this doesn't fit the guidelines, but I believe it is a conceptual issue that is not opinion-based and can be reasonably answered in a single authoritative answer (I'm also struggling to find ...
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0answers
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is forward secrecy irrelevant for non-streaming applications?
I asked a question yesterday about the Keybase key model and got no answers, unfortunately. Let me rephrase the question to make it clearer: in the case, if 2 users just want to send each other low-...
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0answers
64 views
Verifying the ownership of curve25519 public keys
Let's say we have a group of users, authenticated by a server that providers the service, communicating on a secure channel (e.g. over HTTPS/TLS) and each user has a corresponding curve25519 key pair. ...
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43 views
Any gotchas when deriving a symmetric key from two seeds?
Consider a connection protocol where, after jumping through several other hoops, Alice and Bob know each others' public keys; and they now want to do a RSA-handshake-kind-of-thing to come up with a ...