Questions tagged [mac]

(or message authentication code), a short piece of information used to authenticate a message, and the algorithm to create and check such information, using a secret key.

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Can poly1305 be used as an error-correction code?

Given a message $m$ of size $n$, a key $k$, and a message authentication code $mac = poly1305(m, k)$ what is the minimum amount of bitflips on the message that can be corrected (or at least detected) ...
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Attackability of one-time MAC when using block mode

Consider an encrypted message m which is encrypted with AES-CBC, so in addition to the message there is an IV supplied initially....
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XORing Algorithm Outputs To Guard Against Breakthroughs

My question is how safe is XORing two algorithm outputs together... ...For Symmetric Encryption: Master key from CSPRNG ==> MK HKDF-Expand(...
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How is HMAC hashed message decrypted on the receiver side

We know that MAC algorithm and key are used in both sender and receiver side to get the matching MAC tages to prove that the data is authentic. Now in HMAC we know that, it makes use of crytographic ...
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Using Permutation polynomial to compute a MAC

Is the following MAC secure? For a block $y_i$ in a file, we defined a MAC as follows: $Mac_i:PRF(k,i) \cdot g^{y_i \cdot r_i} \bmod p$. Where $p$ is a prime number, $g \in \mathbb{G}$,$PRF(k,i)$ is ...
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Composition of X25519+XSalsa20+Poly1305

In an correct implementation of X25519+XSalsa20+Poly1305, I think I have the right understanding in saying that the Poly1305 message authentication code is a ...
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Attack on envelop mac

As I am reading the Paper: MDx-MAC and building fast MACs from hash functions I am having trouble understanding the Attack on the Envelope Method (4.3). In particular, I am not sure what chaining ...
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Circular Security - Encrypting the key with the key

I know this isn't the best practice, but what if I took a cheap/fast 128-bit stream cipher (assuming both the key and the stream blocks are 128 bits) and mixed in the plainkey with the plaintext (let'...
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Can we get the msg when we know tag and key in Poly1305

Assume $tag[i]=\operatorname{MAC}(key[i],msg)$ Now we know: $tag[0],tag[1],\ldots,tag[n]$ $key[0],key[1],\ldots,key[n]$ Can we get the $msg$ from this? Or can we get the $tag$ of this $msg$ using ...
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Why is plain-hash-then-encrypt not a secure MAC?

It seems that even in MAC-then-encrypt systems like SSL, something like HMAC is used rather than a plain hash. Why? Suppose we use some stream cipher; then why can't we use $Encrypt(m | H(m))$ as ...
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Signature over MAC value for a random key

Would it be possible to create a signature scheme like this: $ \DeclareMathOperator{Gen}{Gen_{\Mac}} \DeclareMathOperator{Mac}{Mac} \DeclareMathOperator{Sign}{Sign} \DeclareMathOperator{F}{F} \...
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Non Repudiation - Message Authentications methods

According to a definition given by my professor: Message authentication methods verify that the message is from the right sender, however they don't guarantee non-repudiation. To me this sounds ...
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What is the function of the secret key “r” in Poly1305?

Poly1305-AES uses two per-connection keys $k$ (for AES) and $r$ (for Poly1305's compression function) and a per-message nonce n to execute. I've read the original paper on the implementation, and I ...
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Strange MAC algorithm

I'm working with a payment provider which uses the following algorithm for signing messages: The merchant is securely given a secret key k, known to them and the ...
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Why MACs are so important despite digital signatures doing everything a MAC can do and more

When an entity A wants to send a message to entity B, he can attach a MAC to the message. Entity B on receiving the message can use the pre-shared key to compute the same MAC and confirm if the ...
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708 views

Length extension attack SHA-1 message division with padding problem?

I'm was reading this example for length extension attack given here link When working out, how the extended block length be divisible by 512 (SHA block size). I'...
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Would a non-envelop, prefix only, SHA2 built MAC be susceptible to key recovery attacks?

When aiming to build a MAC, classic literature discusses the use of Envelopes or key "Sandwich" to build MACs. These were proved to be as secure as HMAC in “Sandwich” Is Indeed Secure: How to ...
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1answer
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When extending the domain of a fixed-length MAC, why do we have to include the message length in each block?

In Katz's text (2nd edition), it states in 4.3.2: The truncation attack can be thwarted by additionally authenticating the message length along with each block. (Authenticating the message ...
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Proof that MAC and hash composition is insecure

Let $F$ be a secure PRF and $H$ a universal hash function. How can I exhibit a pair $(F,H)$ whose composition $$S'((k_1, k_2), m) = F(k_2, H(k_1,m))$$ is an insecure MAC (or an insecure PRF, since a ...
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1answer
85 views

Existence of MAC implies existence of OWF

I'm having trouble understanding how the existence of a MAC implies the existence of an OWF. If the MAC protocol is $(\operatorname{Gen}, \operatorname{MAC}, \operatorname{Ver})$ such that for any ...
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Does the ability to influence the key of a MAC effects its security?

If a PPT adversary can influence the key of a MAC function, is it still secure? For example, if we define $f$ as follow: $f(r,x) = HMAC_{(k\oplus r)}$(x) If the adversary has oracle access to $f$, ...
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Generating a MAC on a Polynomial

In the following, all the operations and polynomials are defined over a finite field of prime order, $\mathbb{F}_p$, where $p$ is a sufficiently large prime number. All polynomials and values below ...
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Is it safe to compute HMAC(Base64(IV) || “,” || Base64(CipherText)) instead of HMAC(IV || CipherText)?

Let || be the concatenation operator. Let CipherText = AES(Key1, IV, Message). Let us assume AES is used in CBC mode. I want ...
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Is using the same MAC twice insecure?

I was thinking last night about whether or not a HMAC-Encrypt-HMAC would be secure if you used the same HMAC key. Here is the full recipe: Compute a HMAC on the data to encrypt, and append it to the ...
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Is attack against secret prefix possible for messages of any size?

I am aware of message extension attack on MACs constructed with a hash function that uses Merkle-Damgård scheme. $$MAC=h(k,x)$$ I am interested if this attack only works if $0 ≡ x$ mod (hash input ...
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Question on MAC Forgery

In MAC forgery, is it assumed that the attacker has the secret key or not? I find this in Wikipedia but still not clear. Existential forgery is the creation (by an adversary) of at least one ...
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How are AEAD, GCM, CBC, Poly1305, EtM, MtE and E&M related?

I am using OpenSSL 1.1.1 to implement a TLS 1.3 communication module so I tried to learn how data integrity and authentication is ensured. I read a lot about AEAD, GCM, CBC, Poly1305, EtM, MtE and E&...
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XCBC Authentication

So XCBC was made to counteract lengths attacks against CBC-MAC, but how exactly does the modification made defeat this attack? All I can find are a few papers on why 2-key XCBC isn't actually secure.
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What is the definition of “security beyond the birthday paradox”?

I'm reading a paper about MACs and I would like to be sure about the meaning of a security beyond the birthday paradox. Is there a definition?
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Differences between MAC and HMAC [duplicate]

After reading many posts, I am still confused about the differences between these two. Let me know if my understanding is correct: MAC is encrypted string that is generated using a secret key and a ...
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2answers
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Parallelizing MACs by subdividing the message and then aggregating results

Most MACs other than GMAC (and Poly1305?) are not parallelizable. Examples include CMAC and HMAC. Could these be securely parallelized by computing multiple MACs in parallel and then combining the ...
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Which HMAC scheme more secure?

Which HMAC scheme is more secure? Or are they of the same level of security? Scheme One Compute a HMAC on the data to encrypt (cleartext/plaintext) Encrypt the data with AES_CTR_256, and append ...
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Security of MAC-Then-Encrypt without MAC key authentication

We have the following settings in our system: TLS 1.2 using legacy cipher suite - OFB mode (using 64 bit block cipher) and trunkated CBC-MAC (32 bit). The goal is to achieve authenticated encryption ...
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1answer
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Zero Knowledge Proofs: to establish a public key cryptography encryption

I am very interested to know in the general sense how two parties who know each other are able to continue a conversation IF and ONLY IF they both earn the same salary. For example, we have a person X ...
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Any benefit to encrypting IV and MAC in a mode like AES-GCM or ChaChaPoly?

Would there be any benefit to symmetrically encrypting the IV and MAC in an AEAD mode of operation? More specifically would this prevent someone from exploiting the accidental use of a duplicate IV ...
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specific scenario question relating to using NACL crypto_box in a protocol

Scenario 1: SenderA sends message1 to ReceiverB message1 is encrypted using NACL crypto_box using SenderA secret key and ReceiverB public key. we understand that the NACL crypto_box authenticator ...
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How to decide whether to use digital signature (RSA) or HMAC

I found multiple posts regarding the differences between HMAC and RSA. Why should I prefer one or the other? These are some examples: HMAC SHA256 vs RSA SHA256 - which one to use What are the ...
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Why there isn't a consistent key transform function of HMAC?

I am currently learning, the internal working of HMAC. There exists a key transformation process in the beginning, which works as follows:- Make the length of $K$ (Key) equal to $B$ (number of bits ...
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1answer
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SHA1 padding on length extension attack

I was recently trying to replicate a length extension attack on SHA1. I implemented the registers state and also the new padding implementation (with the whole of the message that I want to extend). ...
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It is the IV shared in CBC mode?

I don't know if the IV in CBC mode is equal in both sides of the encryption and decryption operations. I know that the IV must be unpredictable, but has it to be MACed in the encryption side to be ...
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Setting MAC field to all-zero to indicate unencrypted data

I'm currently working on a project where we transmit data between two systems. The data is generally encrypted before transmission, however there are certain transmissions that are unencrypted. We ...
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Do AEAD algorithms and encrypt-then-MAC mitigate external decryption oracles?

I'm curious about a possible attack scenario that I'm not sure exists. If it is possible, I'd like to know if and how AEAD algorithms and encrypt-then-MAC implementations protect against it. The ...
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Why is it insecure to use a randomized IV for CBC-MAC instead of an all-zero IV?

A fixed length CBC-MAC uses an all-zero block as the initialization vector. Suppose that we used a randomized IV instead, and sent the IV along with the tag. So if the message $m$ will be $m = b_1 || ...
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What was used for symmetric message authentication before HMAC was invented?

Currently, Carter Wegman MACs are popular. Before that, HMAC was popular. What was popular before HMAC? Was it CBC-MAC? Something else? I know about NIST FIPS 113 "Data Authentication Algorithm" ...
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DUKPT MAC Variant key [closed]

I'm currently implementing an interface that makes use of the DUKPT (Derived Unique Key Per Transaction) scheme to generate MAC keys. This particular interface uses a different (variant) of the MAC ...
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Key size vs output size of a MAC

What is more important, in terms of security, the size of the MAC or the size of the key that it uses? I'm asking this because I have to answer the following homework question: What is more secure? ...
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Can the encrypt-and-authenticate method result in secure authenticated encryption if the MAC scheme has unique tags(non-deterministic)?

If we use non-deterministic MACs in encrypt-and-authenticate approach, is it secure?
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What Are Secure Limits to Truncate the Authentication Tag (Mac) for Short Messages?

I have messages with the following fixed lengths: 4 byte 8 byte 16 byte I want to encrypted them and prevent modification by appending an authentication tag using a MAC algorithm of my choosing (e.g....
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Is following MAC schemes formed by MAC schemes secure?

Given two MAC schemes $\prod_1 = (keyGen_1, S_1, V_1)$ and $\prod_2=(keyGen_2, S_2, V_2)$. $\prod_3$ runs $keyGen$ from $\prod_1$ and $\prod_2$, respectively, to obtain $(k_1, k_2)$. $\prod_3$, where ...

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