Questions tagged [mac]

(or message authentication code), a short piece of information used to authenticate a message, and the algorithm to create and check such information, using a secret key.

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1answer
626 views

Is HMAC prone to birthday attacks?

Popular attacks on cryptographic hash algorithms are "birthday attacks" . At high level , if a hash function produces $n$ bits of output, an attacker who computes only $2^{n/2}$ hash operations on ...
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1answer
555 views

Equivalent security of KMAC and different HMAC instances?

In the August 2016 draft of SP 800-185, SHA-3 Derived Functions (pdf) there is a table for equivalent security settings for KMAC, the MAC derived from SHA-3, and some previous MACs (Table 1 on pages ...
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1answer
450 views

How come “short” (eg 80 bit) MACs are regarded to be safe?

I‘ve got two questions: Why are much shorter output lengths of, e.g 80 bits, sufficient for MACs ? Assume a message $x$ that is sent in clear together with its MAC over the channel: $(x,MAC_k(x))$. ...
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2answers
852 views

Is the security of MAC function is based on HASH function

It is widely known, generally, that a MAC is a HASH with key. I just want to ensure that my understanding is correct to avoid base further assumptions on wrong conception. So, if I used MAC that uses ...
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1answer
111 views

Is using a rolling code as a constantly-changing shared secret effective for signing?

I am your average developer looking for some crypto-related guidance. I am trying to have assurance that a received message is from a particular sender, but have no need for the message content to be ...
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2k views

Why would Carter-Wegman-style message authentication not be broken by P = NP?

Researching about the implications of P = NP to cryptography I found someone say that the only cryptography left standing would be the one time pad and Carter-Wegman-Style message authentication. ...
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513 views

uf-cma and uf-cmva probabilistic MAC

Is there any simple probabilistic MAC $\Pi=(\operatorname{Gen},\operatorname{Tag},\operatorname{Vrfy})$ with UF-CMA security but without UF-CMVA security? How can an attacker efficiently use the $\...
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6answers
4k views

Why MACs are so important despite digital signatures doing everything a MAC can do and more

When an entity A wants to send a message to entity B, he can attach a MAC to the message. Entity B on receiving the message can use the pre-shared key to compute the same MAC and confirm if the ...
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2answers
264 views

MAC unforgeability and secret key guessing

The standard notion security for MACs is usually expressed by means of experiments like the following one (given an attacker A): $k \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda)$ Invoke $A^{\mathsf{TAG}_k(\cdot)...
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2answers
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Layman's description of the padding oracle attack

I understand that the MAC-then-encrypt approach is susceptible to several attacks including the so called padding oracle attack. I understand that in this attack the attacker modifies the padding and ...
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1answer
116 views

Under which conditions would it be OK to use “H(pass||data)”?

I understand that the main motivation for HMAC is extension attacks. If data always has content-length either implicit in the app or even explicitly put into the hash, I get the impression that HMAC ...
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2answers
84 views

How can I resolve this basic MAC paradox I’m stumbling upon in my proof?

Suppose $S: K \times M \to T$ is a secure MAC. ($K$ = key space, $M$ = message space, $T = \{0,1\}^n$ = tag space.) $S$ being secure means that no matter what messages $m_1,...,m_q$ we throw at $S$ ...
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2answers
1k views

Can any MAC be used as a KDF?

First, let me clarify what I mean with a Key Derivation Function (KDF). I'm interested in KDFs that take an $n$-bit symmetric master key and some diversification data of arbitrary length as input and ...
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Do we still need HMAC now that SHA3 is here? [duplicate]

In Another look at HMAC from Koblitz and Menezes, they state that HMAC came along because doing h(secret || message) was vulnerable to length extension attacks. But as far as I know, these kind of ...
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Safe MAC proof check

Let $(Mac, Vrfy)$ be a safe defined $MAC$ over $(K,M,T)$ where $ M = \{0,1\}^n$ and $T = \{0,1\}^{128}$. Is the following $MAC$ safe? Show your proof. $Mac'(k,m) = Mac(k, m)$ $Vrfy'(k,m,t) = \{Vrfy(...
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1answer
135 views

Security of a MAC

Let $(Mac, Vrfy)$ be a safe defined $MAC$ over $(K,M,T)$ where $ M = \{0,1\}^n$ and $T = \{0,1\}^{128}$. Is the following $MAC$ safe? Show your proof. $Mac'(k,m) = Mac(k, m ⊕ m)$ $Vrfy'(k,m,t) = ...
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1answer
360 views

Is this hash function almost XOR universal?

Consider this hash function: The key $K$ is $2^n$ bits. The message $M$ is divided into $2^n$ bit blocks. Arithmetic is performed modulo $2^{n+1}$. The hash is defined by: $ H_0 = 1 $. $H_{i+1} = (...
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1answer
107 views

Encrypt-then-MAC when encrypting data in multiple blocks?

Given a stream cipher such as ChaCha20 and a MAC such as Poly1305, how do we handle data that comes in chunks in the encrypt-then-MAC scheme ? For example, the plaintext is 530 bytes long. We read ...
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2answers
939 views

Using bcrypt for MAC - is it correct and secure?

Suppose there is a hashing function: $$ph = bcrypt(sha256(m + k), salt)$$ Here $ph$ is a password hash obtaining by applying $bcrypt$ on $sha256$ result of concatenating a message $m$ with a secret ...
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1answer
5k views

Insecurity of CBC-MAC

Can anyone explain why CBC-MAC is not secure for variable length message? I read many books, but there are still some confusion. Such as the highlighted parts in previous pictures Questions: why ...
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How to normalize data of a generic HTTP request for the purpose of signing

I am working on PowerAuth 2.0, a solution for counter-based signing of HTTP requests (for the purpose of mobile banking). One of the tasks that I solved somehow but I am still not happy with the ...
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1answer
106 views

Why does Carter-Wegman MAC have 2n-bit output?

The Coursera course on Cryptography 1 has a section about Carter-Wegman MAC. Here is the image of slide: Now my question is both $F$ and $S$ output $n$-bit strings. We XOR two $n$-bit strings and we ...
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1answer
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SipHash's (non-)collision resistance

I'm very new to cryptography, and I need help understanding the security claims made in Aumasson and Bernstein's paper on the SipHash. In particular, I'm trying to understand the following statement ...
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1answer
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Prove that the following MAC is insecure

I am trying to prove that the following MAC is insecure, but I don't know how to exploit the properties of the pseudorandom function $F$ involved: Gen generates a uniform $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$. To ...
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2answers
117 views

Strength of $H(k\|H(m))$ as a MAC algorithm

What is the strength of $H(k \| H(m))$ compared to HMAC? Compared to $H(m \| k)$? What is the strength in bits of a given key/output size?
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2answers
857 views

Why can't we use the first block of AES-CBC as MAC

As per topic, why can't we use the first block as MAC instead of using the last block? what's the rationale?
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1answer
2k views

Do I need to use a MAC with asymmetric encryption?

The internet has drilled into me that when I delivery any symmetrically encrypted data, I should also deliver a MAC to authenticate it before any decryption occurs. Do I also need to do this if I use ...
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3answers
360 views

About MAC and HMAC

I'm studying mechanisms of integrity and authentication in symmetric encryption scenarios. I want to propose some examples to see whether I got the point here: Let $m$ be the message, $c$ the ...
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0answers
151 views

Authenticated encryption with Enc-Sign-Mac

I've given a CPA secure private key encryption scheme, an unforgeable private key MAC scheme and an unforgeable public key signature scheme. I want to combine them to protect confidentiality, ...
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1answer
182 views

Authenticated encryption with Signatures

I've given a CPA secure private key encryption scheme (wich gets to a CCA secure scheme or better to an authenticated encryption scheme, when i combine it with a given MAC) and a unforgeable public ...
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1answer
706 views

A simple keyed message authentication code using XOR

Suppose I have a key that is at least 32 characters in length and provides at least 128-bits of entropy. If I picked from the character set of [a-hjkmnp-z2-9-], ...
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1answer
63 views

Uniqueness of checksums using DES-MAC encryption?

I'm in an Intro to Computer Security class, and one concept I'm having trouble understanding is how two different files could produce the same checksum. How would you produce the same checksum given ...
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0answers
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Which protocols / file formats use CBC with a random IV and without a MAC?

Disclaimer: I am a noob so this may well be a stupid question or one that's been asked before. I didn't see it come up after searching, though, so I'm going to assume it hasn't been asked here. The ...
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2answers
317 views

Difference between MAC and Authenticated Encryption?

I am currently studying authenticated encryption and I was wondering if there was a difference between using a MAC and authenticated encryption. It seemed like authenticated encryption schemes use ...
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2answers
334 views

Why is $Mac_k(m_1||m_2) = ⟨F_k(m_1), F_k(m_1 \oplus \overline{m_2})⟩$ not a secure MAC?

I am preparing for an exam and trying to solve the following question I found on the internet: Let $F_k$ be a pseudorandom function. Show that the following MAC for messages of length $2n$ is ...
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227 views

Confidentiality then Integrity with different keys

Can anyone describe how we can do what is said in the below sentence which is in Mark Stamp crypto slides (PPTX) on slide number 101 : Can do a little better - about 1.5 “encryptions” The whole ...
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1answer
204 views

SIV - Synthetic IV - S2V Construction? Benefits over a MAC or Hash?

Looking at the SIV construction in rfc-5297 - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5297 With regards to the generation of the SIV, using S2V construction, I am struggling to find the benefits of the chosen ...
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1answer
1k views

Understanding WPA2 authentication in details

As far as I know, WPA2 authentication consists of a 4-way handshake. The first message is from the AP, containing the ANounce, a random number generated by the AP, The second message is from the ...
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1answer
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How would the opponent defraud this secure communication?

I am new in the cryptography and the information security problems, I try to understand things as much as I can and I know it's really complicated in the beginning. Considering the communication ...
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2answers
424 views

Is a PRF applied to a secure MAC also a secure MAC?

Suppose I apply a PRF to a secure MAC. Do I still have a secure MAC?
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1answer
192 views

Creating a message authentication scheme

I have such situation. I have a device like dongle. But it has certain limitations. For example, it can only have implemented encryption and decryption functionality. The availability of ciphers ...
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0answers
519 views

Can a secure MAC break if the adversary is given oracle access to Verify?

In the Mac-forge experiment, the adversary is given access to a tag-generation oracle, which generates a tag for each message given by the adversary. The adversary's task is to generate a valid tag on ...
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1answer
170 views

Can an attacker recover the key if a Poly1305 collision is known?

Suppose that messages $m_1$ and $m_2 \neq m_1$, both known to the attacker, are both MAC'd through Poly1305 with the same key. By chance, these two messages hash to the same value. The attacker ...
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1answer
580 views

Difference between single-pass and two-pass MACs

I am having trouble understanding where the count of "passes" come in. What constitutes a pass in the context of message authentication codes? How are single-pass MACs achieved?
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2answers
1k views

Is reusing keys for CBC and CBC-MAC secure when using encrypt-then-MAC?

I know reusing keys is a bad idea, especially for CBC and CBC-MAC, but the example for why on Wikipedia seemed to use encrypt-and-MAC. It seems obvious that the last block of encryption will be equal ...
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1answer
485 views

Why does a fixed key not make MACs like CBC-MAC or GMAC into secure hash functions? [duplicate]

Why does setting the secret key to a fixed, public value not make MACs like CBC-MAC or EMAC into secure unkeyed cryptographic hash functions? In other words, why is the resulting hash function not ...
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1answer
101 views

Find the minimum Adversary's Advantage

I am wondering how to solve the problem below: Suppose we have a $MAC$ scheme $I=(S,V)$. There is another algorithm that can find a pair of texts $(m0,m1)$, with $m0≠m1$ such that $S(k,m0)=S(k,m1)$ ...
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1answer
208 views

Key Exchange MAC encryption order of events? Problem

I want to write the sequence of events of how a MAC encryption works for documentation at work. For this purpose I have a document (given by my boss to me) in German and I am trying to translate it ...
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2answers
366 views

MAC algorithm difficulties

Can anyone explain to me why this is a bad idea? I cannot see anything wrong with it except that key K should be different for MAC and AES. MAC algorithm consists of letting the MAC of message M (...
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1answer
616 views

Side channel security of HMAC in software

Assume we have a processor with a symmetric co-processor that supports AES. This processor does however not provide co-processor support for hash algorithms such as SHA-1 or SHA-256. I've got the ...

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