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Questions tagged [security-definition]

Questions about formal definitions of "security" for various cryptographic schemes (e.g. perfect secrecy, semantic security, ciphertext indistinguishability, etc.)

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About the complexity of a path finding attack for a path encrypted with a block cipher (like AES). How many AES calculations count as secure?

Out of $N = s^3$ total points we pick a starting point $p$ and an end point $q$ with $$p=(p_1, p_2)$$ $$q=(q_1,q_2)$$ $$p_1,q_1 \in [0,s)$$ $$p_2,q_2 \in [0,s^2)$$ We want to find a path in between ...
J. Doe's user avatar
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Explanation of the term "view" for algorithm or adversary

What is the view of an algorithm/adversary? Is view just a term used to describe the output over a set of inputs for a probabilistic algorithm? For example: Consider experiment Mac-forgeA,Π (n). ...
Nebulous Ryan's user avatar
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On the Adaptive Security of MPC Protocols

In adversarial context of MPC, the corruption behavior refers to the assumptions about the corrupted parties’ deviation level from the protocol specification. Three main types of corruption behaviors ...
NB_1907's user avatar
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How to get started with Simulation and UC proofs?

I've been in my PhD program for a few months, and every time I try to understand the simulation and UC proof-paradigms I get so confused. I feel like what I really need is an easy set of (guided) ...
FearfulJoe's user avatar
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2 different definitions of Special Soundness

There are 2 different definitions of special soundness in the literature: (1) can be found in Damgard: We say that a Sigma-protocol $\Pi$ satisfies special soundness, if there exists a PPT extractor $\...
jvdh's user avatar
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Differences in definitions of "Computational Special Soundness"

I am looking at Unruh's transform (ePrint 2014/587) and in particular the definition in §2.2 for computational special soundness in sigma protocols. Let $\cal{R} \subset \cal{X} \times \cal{Y}$ be ...
Eamonn Postlethwaite's user avatar
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452 views

Hash Function Properties

What I am trying to understand is shown in all three properties of a secure hash function, I will focus on Preimage attack resistance. Preimage resistance: given a hash h, it's difficult to find m s.t....
Antonis Paragas's user avatar
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Can a secure MAC break if the adversary is given oracle access to Verify?

In the Mac-forge experiment, the adversary is given access to a tag-generation oracle, which generates a tag for each message given by the adversary. The adversary's task is to generate a valid tag on ...
sayantankhan's user avatar
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2k views

What is the difference between mutual authentication and unilateral authentication both ways?

I am currently reading Engineering Security by Peter Gutmann, on page 7 he states: proper mutual authentication is quite different from unilateral authentication in both directions He references ...
FlorianZiegler's user avatar
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Variant of CCA security for Paillier with blinded decryption oracle

Consider a variant of the Paillier encryption scheme where the message space is restricted to $\mathbb{Z}_q$ such that the RSA modulus $N$ of the Paillier cryptosystem satisfies $N > q + q^2$. I am ...
Prashant Agrawal's user avatar
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Semantic Security equivalent to Real/Random Semantic Security

I'm reading Boneh and Shoup's book "A Graduate Course in Applied Cryptography." Im doing one of the questions at the end of the stream ciphers chapter. I'm not sure how to do this problem: ...
cryptolearner's user avatar
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How do adversary models and security types relate [from InfoSec SE]

I have been told to move the question to this forum in order to get a better insight, so here we go: Reading some questions in this forum I encountered this answer mentioning IND-CPA as a requirement ...
Alvai's user avatar
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On the Definition of a PRG and a CSPRG

I've been looking at the definition of a PRG, here. This is a broader notion than a cryptographically secure PRG ("CSPRG"), which is described here. I am realizing that I am very confused by this ...
Diagon's user avatar
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Difference between an authentication scheme and a identification scheme in ZK proofs?

EDIT: I want to specify what I know about schemes security: Authentication schemes: P can prove V he is P, and nobody else can prove V that they are P. Identification schemes: P can prove V he is P, ...
Andrea Farneti's user avatar
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96 views

Encrypting random coins used for the encryption itself

Circular security notions for PKE schemes capture the security of (PKE) schemes when encrypting the secret decryption key. Is there an analogous notion but for encrypting the randomness used for the ...
guilhermemtr's user avatar
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169 views

Uniform vs Non-uniform Attackers

There is a concept of attackers gaining some information before attacking a system and those attackers being called non-uniform attackers. How do the security proofs for cryptographic primitives in ...
Novice_researcher's user avatar
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An exercise to show that CBC Chain is insecure

The CBC-Chain mode of operation is a CBC variant in which the IV that is used for the very first message to be encrypted is randomly selected, whereas the IV used for each subsequent encrypted message ...
Sayantan's user avatar
2 votes
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decrypting a one-time-pad that outputs 0,1 in preknown probabilities

assuming a two users want to use a one time pad ciphersystem, and they are using a program that was developed by a third party that was supposed to create random undependable bits, but for some reason ...
alberto123's user avatar
2 votes
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55 views

Can ideal functionalities share variables

I am trying to define an ideal world for a protocol that requires two functionalities to interact with each other. Lets call them $\mathcal{F}_1$ and $\mathcal{F}_2$. Now $\mathcal{F}_1$ maintains a ...
zkvroon's user avatar
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Are there any security definitions for DNS?

Given a recent post on the Tor blog and the corresponding discussion on HN I was wondering if there are any security definitions for DNS or similar name systems. So something similar to ACCE for TLS ...
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Security aspects of a splitted Pohlig-Hellman system

Given a Polig-Hellman (is that really the name for that?) system with $$C = M^k \bmod p$$ where $M$ is the message, $C$ is the ciphertext, $k$ is a (secret) key (any integer relatively prime to $p-1$...
ChaosCoder's user avatar
2 votes
0 answers
62 views

Quantifying bit security for smart-vercauteren encryption scheme

I am working on project that requires to compare in terms of security between two encryption schemes, one of them is the SV scheme. However, I dont know what are the steps exactly towards quantifying ...
Never too late's user avatar
2 votes
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700 views

Ideal system for an encryption scheme

What is the ideal system for an encryption scheme? For a pseudorandom permutation the ideal one is a random permutation, for a pseudorandom function the ideal one is a random function. For an ...
Dingo13's user avatar
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1 answer
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Defining the random variables $K,M,C$ and Perfect Secrecy

In many books on Cryptography, we refer to probability distributions over the key space $\mathcal{K}$, over the plaintext space $\mathcal{M}$ and over the ciphertext space $\mathcal{C}$. Then, we let $...
Chris's user avatar
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How secure is this hash combination function for merkle trees?

I am exploring the class of functions that I have seen called "hash combination functions". These functions are arguably distinct from hash functions, generally providing second-preimage ...
Justin Martin's user avatar
1 vote
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57 views

Is the security of output of Skein when using arbitrary output size similar to that of SHAKE?

Let's suppose I have a 1MB high-resolution photo and I want to hash and create a 1536-bits key. I know that I could just use SHAKE-256 as its a pre-enginered way for doing that. There is also Skein ...
phantomcraft's user avatar
1 vote
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100 views

Clarification for CCA security (or - why is the following not a Rabin CCA attack?)

In three different, highly reputable sources (e.g. "Introduction to Modern Cryptography" by Katz and Lindell, 2007), the definition of CCA attack doesn't allow the adversary to decrypt the ...
Anon's user avatar
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Question about sequence length/count/security of $x\mapsto x^\alpha \mod (N=Q\cdot R)$, with $Q=2q_1q_2+1$ and $R=2r_1r_2+1$ and $\alpha = 2q_2r_2$

Given a number $N$ with $$N=Q\cdot R$$ $$Q=2\cdot q_1 \cdot q_2+1$$ $$R=2\cdot r_1\cdot r_2+1$$ with different primes $P,Q,q_1,q_2,r_1,r_2$. If we now choose an exponent $\alpha$ containing prime ...
J. Doe's user avatar
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Exact security requirements for extendable output functions (XOF)?

In the FIPS202 document "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions" an extendable-output functions is defined as: An extendable-output function (XOF) is a ...
cryptobeginner's user avatar
1 vote
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63 views

If a different plaintext may produce the same ciphertext, is the system perfectly secure?

Define the injective map $\phi: \Omega\rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, such that $\Omega=\mathcal{A}^n$ denotes the set of all strings of length $n\in\mathbb{N}^*$ from an alphabet $\mathcal{A}$ of elements $...
UNOwen's user avatar
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1 vote
0 answers
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Prove that secure authenticated encryption system composed with itself is secure

Suppose $(E,D)$ provides authenticated encryption with key space $K$. Define $(E',D')$ with key space $K^2$ as follows: $$ E'((k_1,k_2),m) = E(k_2,E(k_1,m)) \\ D'((k_1,k_2),c) = \begin{cases} D(k_1,E(...
ByteEater's user avatar
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1 vote
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Distributional Virtual Black Box security

Can anyone clearly explain the difference between these two notions of obfuscation security: VBB security and D-VBB Security. VBB Security: An obfuscated program is no better than just a black box ...
Vshi's user avatar
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1 vote
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How to compare two post quantum digital signature schemes in terms of latency?

I want to compare two digital signature schemes of different nature. One is Hash-based (Winternitz one time signature scheme) and the other is lattice-based (Dilithium Crystals). What about be an ...
invalidexplorer's user avatar
1 vote
0 answers
52 views

How to evaluate number of security bits of a signature scheme?

I am trying to evaluate the effective security levels that a digital signature scheme (namely post-quantum digital schemes like WOT-S (Winternitz one time signature scheme) and Dilithium Crystals). ...
invalidexplorer's user avatar
1 vote
0 answers
98 views

How to formally define the security of Random Oblivious Transfer

Assume that there is a protocol $(A,B)$ such that receives no input and satisfies: $A$ - outputs two random bits $x_0, x_1 \in \{0,1\}$ $B$ - outputs a random bit $b \in \{0,1\}$ and also outputs $x_b$...
Gabi G's user avatar
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1 vote
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579 views

Game-based proofs and semantic security

After reading this question, I understood that "game-based" and "simulation-based" have to do with the way that security properties are postulated. In particular, IND-CPA is a canonical example of ...
CTN's user avatar
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Precise Definition of 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer

What's the precise definition for 1-out-of-2 OT? and what's the best way to show that it can't be achieved under unconditionally secure setting? I am reading about it and just couldn't get my head ...
Mark's user avatar
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159 views

Reduction to security of proof system for proving knowledge

I want to prove security of my system by reduction to the security of an underlying non-interactive proof system for proving knowledge. I know a game that captures the desired security property of my ...
learning's user avatar
1 vote
0 answers
142 views

How does the offline authentication work?

In these slides, offline and online PUF-based authentication protocols are explained in minute 16:30 and 17:30, respectively. I understand the way the online protocol works. Basically, the server ...
Shannon's user avatar
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204 views

Non-Repudiation vs Identity-Binding

There are 3 properties offered by a cryptographic digital signature scheme: Integrity guarantee of the message signed. Authenticity guarantee of the message signed. Non-repudiation of the message ...
DannyNiu's user avatar
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1 vote
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282 views

Indistinguishable encryptions and CPA-secure example

Let $ F $ be a PRF and $ G$ be a PRG with expansion factor $n \to n +1 $ For the following encryption scheme, decide whether it has indistinguishable encryptions and whether it is CPA-secure. ...
nachofest's user avatar
1 vote
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162 views

Mersenne Twister's vulnerabilty with small-size distributions

C++ rookie here, trying to wrap his head around (CS)PRNGs. I (assume that I) already understand the concept of the Mersenne Twister being "broken" (i.e. not cryptographically secure) due to its ...
xnc469's user avatar
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1 vote
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56 views

Proofs of security for anonymity in a multi-party setting

I'm looking for material that proves the anonymity of parties in a non-interactive setting. I would like to know if there are simulation based proofs (UC) and property based proofs (game based) for ...
zkvroon's user avatar
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1 vote
0 answers
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A qusetion about the security game of Certificateless signatures

Recently I read Certificateless Public Auditing for Data Integrity in the Cloud , I have a question about the security of proposed HOMOMORPHIC AUTHENTICABLE CLS. (Sec. IV). For the Type-I Adversary, ...
JACK GAO's user avatar
1 vote
0 answers
395 views

Design flaw in IND-CKA definition of Searchable Symmetric Encryption?

I am a graduate student interested in searchable encryption research. I carefully read the Secure Indexes paper published in 2004, and I was confused about the IND-CKA, the game-based security ...
Jiangnan's user avatar
1 vote
0 answers
89 views

RIsk mitigation: block cypher vs xor

It sort of looks like to me that there is a kind of risk mitigation in the architecture of block cyphers vs the xor cypher. In XOR, the risk is entirely in the random number generator. The XOR ...
cryptonoob400's user avatar
1 vote
0 answers
53 views

Homomorphic encryption and approximated GCD 2

This is a further question to the one reached here Homomorphic encryption and approximated GCD. I am now thinking about a symmetric cipher in which the plaintext set is integers, illustrated as ...
user147687's user avatar
1 vote
0 answers
575 views

Relationship between "Entropy" and "Security" in crypto functions

There is a lot of confusion between "entropy" and "security" of a cryptographic function. I like to visualize it as the entropy being the water, and the crypto function being a glass. So for ...
cryptonoob400's user avatar
1 vote
0 answers
215 views

Privacy-Preserving Protocols and Proofs of Security

While dabbling in privacy-preserving protocols (mainly using Semi-Homomorphic Encryption) and coming up with miscellaneous ideas for comparison tests or other similar primitives, based on obfuscation ...
Dave's user avatar
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1 vote
1 answer
85 views

Can we determine a security parameter in the hybrid argument where the number of hybrids is polynomially bounded but not known?

Let $\lambda$ be a statistical security parameter. Consider a security proof that is based on hybrid argument, where there are polynomially many (say, $n = p(\lambda)$) hybrids, $H_1, ..., H_n$. Any ...
X. G.'s user avatar
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