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Questions tagged [side-channel-attack]

attacks using information leaked by implementations of cryptographic algorithms to obtain information about keys or (plaintext) data, instead of (or additional to) using cryptographic weaknesses.

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Software timing attack using Kocher method

What's the minimum number of random sample points needed in Kocher's timing attack, so that we can determine enough valid measurements of $A_{i,r}$ and $D_{i,r}$? I'm working from this paper: Volker ...
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Why is it safe to generate the secret key and masking vectors using rejection sampling in CRYSTALS-Dilithium?

In CRYSTALS-Dilithium module lattice-based digital signatures, the secret key vectors $s_1, s_2$ with coefficients in $[-\eta, \eta]$ and the signature masking vector $y$ with coefficients in $(-\...
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114 views

Why are matrices so common in symmetric encryption?

Matrices have been used in symmetric ciphers since the Hill Cipher (before?) all the way up to modern ciphers such as Twofish and AES. I understand matrices can be invertible, therefore making them ...
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225 views

Side-channel attacks for ARM conditional instructions

I'm implementing some cryptographic functions on an ARM Cortex-M4 and would like to be safe against side-channel attacks, like power and timing attacks. For efficiency I'd like to use conditional ...
2
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32 views

RSA: Blinding versus fixed-time computation

For RSA, what is the standard solution against timing attacks? I know about RSA blinding as one solution. Another solution is to always compute both the squared value and square-and-multiply values, ...
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71 views

AES-128 8th round bit fault propagation

It's well known that by injecting a byte fault during the 8th round of AES 128 just before the mix column the key can be recovered with $2^{32}$-key space. A brute force attack is then possible but ...
2
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201 views

RSA most significant bit oracle attack

I have been reading up on RSA attacks and came across a problem that could be called a most-significant-bit (MSB) oracle attack. For the sake of clarity, let's define RSA primes $(p, q)$, private key ...
2
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43 views

How do we perform second order differential power analysis attack?

I have read papers which describe that the power traces(acquired from a side channel resistant implementation like masking) need to be centered and squared, then a correlation needs to be performed ...
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142 views

AES-128: How to find cipherkey comparing wrong and right ciphertexts?

I have a .mat file which contains 10 plaintexts and 10 ciphertexts which are correctly encrypted with AES-128 algorithm. It also contains 10 more ciphertexts which are wrongly encrypted. The fault is ...
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200 views

How many messages needs to be send to server to get AES key in Cache-timing Attack

I'm trying to evaluate the correlation between key length and the number of messages that needs to be send to server during Cache timing Attack. I read both D. Bernstein, “Cache-timing attacks on AES,...
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42 views

Side Channel Attack Evaluation Methods

I am studying the SCA Evaluation method success rate, and I have a doubt regarding to it. From my understanding, to calculate success rate, first we have a pool of traces all using same key and ...
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121 views

AES Fault Attack

Induce random fault (non-zero) error in one byte before MixColumns in Round 9 I get last round key with 32 bit (4 bytes) missing (Missing are bytes 1, 8, 11, 14) How can I recover these key bytes ...
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Randomness in Trichina's secure AND operation

In this paper, Elena Trichina introduces a way to compute a masked AND operation. The principle is the following: Having two operands $a$ and $b$ masked with random boolean shares $x$ and $y$ ($\...
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240 views

Cracking a key using a combination of partial keys

As part of a cryptanalytic attack I've carried out, I used a divide-and-conquer strategy to divide the secret key $k$ into several equal-sized partial keys $k = {k_1, k_2, ...}$. The attack works ...
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42 views

(Side channel) attack on a PIC18 micro controller

I'm trying to get some practical experience on (side channel) attacks. First I want to note all possible vulnerabilities. I thought about: Preset I have physical access and I own/wrote the software, ...
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405 views

Side channel attack on FPGA AES engine

I actually don't know if this is the right place where ask, but I try. The side channel attacks aren't a negligible problem. There are several ways to protect from these attacks its own IP inside the ...
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207 views

side channel attacks against TDES (compared to AES)

We all know AES has some pretty strong side channel attacks, some where (with a couple of hundred know plain- and ciphertext combinations) a key can be derived in a matter of minutes. Others may take ...