Questions tagged [voting]

Voting is a method for a group such as a meeting or an electorate to make a decision or express an opinion.

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Why blind signature schemes provides an easy way to “vote market” in electronic voting?

Recently I learned about Blind Signatures and why people say they are not really usefull for electronic voting. They ensure that you can easily "sell" your vote and this is something ...
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1answer
45 views

Which are the current solutions to the illegal values in the homomorphic secret sharing?

There is a usual example about homomorphic secret sharing, focused on e-voting. Supposing we use Shamir's scheme for the Secret Sharing system, a participant generates a polynomial whose a0 is +1 (yes)...
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Model a dishonest majority controlled by several adversaries in a voting protocol?

In the context of secure multi-party computation protocols, when a dishonest majority is considered, it is assumed the worst case scenario, i.e., all the corrupted parties are controlled by the same ...
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What Digital Signature Scheme should we use?

My team wants to implement the ElectionGuard as the main part of an e-voting scheme (even if it is known that e-voting protocols are malleable; for the purposes of the voting scheme it is enough). ...
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Generate subkeys from a pool of main keys without being able to link them together?

Let's say I have a pool of keys, which each identify a person. Is there a trustless way to generate new tokens based on this pool, so that I have a new token for every original token, but in a way ...
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What is blindness and forgeability in chaum blind signature scheme?

I am going through the voting protocols. I know how blind signature works (Blind Signature), but why is blind signature - unconditionally ”blind”, conditionally ”unforgeable" (as highlighted in the ...
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1answer
124 views

Murder Mystery Party

For a "Murder Mystery Party", one person is chosen anonymously to be the murderer (i.e., only the murderer knows who the murderer is) by shuffling cards with everyone randomly taking a private card (...
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43 views

Is “Bingo voting” insecure against a corrupt election authority?

I am reading about "Bingo voting" (Wikipedia, Paper), and I'm not understanding how it is secure against a corrupt election authority. If the election authority knows all the dummy votes $N_j^i$, ...
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1answer
57 views

Maintaining validity of ZKP throughout re-randomization of homomorphic ciphertext without linkability to previous ciphertext

Question: How is it possible to adapt a ZKP for a homomorphic ciphertext to still be valid after said ciphertext has been re-randomized? Context: In a lot of e-voting systems homomorphic encryption ...
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Is there a scheme to force a party to generate a fresh key?

Is there a way to force one party to generate a fresh key, such that another party can be convinced that the key was freshly generated, without that party also knowing the key? I'm motivated by a ...
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1answer
33 views

Randomization attack in voting protocols

I'm looking into coercion-resistant voting schemes and one of the key elements of coercion-resistance is resistance to randomization attacks. Juels et al. define a randomization attack as one where ...
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1answer
61 views

How to prove element equality in G1 using Groth-Sahai proofs

In the BeleniosRF e-voting scheme, Groth-Sahai proofs with the "Instantiation based on the SXDH assumption" are used (see https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/155, version 20160411:065033, page 24). In the ...
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How is the Swiss post e-voting system supposed to work, and how was it wrong?

I read that the Swiss post had an e-voting solution developed, made it possible to obtain the source code for review, and that vulnerabilities were found. Apparently we are not talking about the ...
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283 views

Any ideas to make an Electronic Voter Machine more secure? [closed]

EVMs are not secure they say. So how can we make it more secure tham the existing one using cryptography?
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622 views

What is chain voting?

I read The Three Ballot Voting System by Rivest. This paper-based voting system can be attacked with chain voting. But can't find any description of what "Chain voting" is mentioned in section 4.9. ...
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Helios voting system voting verification

In the decryption step in helios, why do we need Chaum-Pedersen to prove that a certain plaintext $m$ corresponds to a given ciphertext $c$? Why can we just encrypt $m$ and see if it's equal to $c$?
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Helios: Where are admin tools stated in the paper

I read the Helios Paper Helios: Web-based Open-Audit Voting. In section 4.4 Anonymization they are saying that "once the voting period ends" the admin can "shuffle" (re-encrypt and permutate), "...
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139 views

How might one create a system of election by lot (sortition) that is both secure and verifiable?

I've been puzzling recently over sortition, a democratic method of selection for public office which I find very fascinating. Basically, instead of choosing candidates like Hillary Clinton or Donald ...
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92 views

Non-interactive public sum of private values

Suppose there is a large number of participants each with a secret value. The secret values are very large (e.g. 256-bit integers). Each participant has published a public commitment to their secret ...
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1answer
291 views

Why is this voting system not secure?

Why not have each person simply treated as a counterparty to an off-the-record chat? People show up in groups and show an ID which is cross-referenced against a central database to prevent Sybil ...
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1answer
325 views

Anonymity of Paillier cryptosystem in e-voting system

I'm not an expert so at the moment I'm trying to figure out (at high level) how such cryptosystem would exploit it's homomorphic properties to guarantee anonymity in a e-voting system. As far as i ...
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204 views

Non interactive ZKP that encrypted additive elgamal message is in set of valid messages

This is taken from Anonymous voting by two-round public discussion by F. Hao P.Y.A. Ryan P. Zielinski Votes are encrypted using the additive variant of ElGamal. I am also using ECElgamal. The idea is ...
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1answer
127 views

Revealing vote after time

Imagine we have 5 different parties, all of these parties test if a particular thing is true or false over the course of 24 hours. The network needs to come to a consensus about the majority outcome ...
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56 views

Aggregating Votes

Voters may vote 0 or 1. We want to aggregate their votes, proving runs efficiently $O(n)$ in number of votes but verifying runs $O(1)$ or $O(\log n)$. Voting has to be cryptographically secure - no ...
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111 views

Secure way to Tally Votes

I want to find a secure and efficient way to tally votes. Say we have N ~ 10000 voters. Each one can vote for candidate 1, candidate 0, or both. But no one can vote more than once. The groups who ...
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1answer
185 views

Cryptographically secure shaming

I was thinking of the problem of naming&shaming, victims don't want to reveal themselves. Yet the public wants to know, and have some confidence in the veracity of statements. Such confidence ...
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1answer
139 views

Zero-knowledge voting with hidden weights

Assume a voting with delegates, where each delegate's vote $v_i \in \{-1,1\}$ has a certain weight $w_i$ depending on the number of people who elected the delegate. Is there a way to calculate the ...
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147 views

Estonian e-voting, vote verification system

I believe I do understand the basics of how the Estonian e-voting system works, but I'm stuck at their vote verification system. In order to get the vote verified, a client needs to encrypt all of the ...
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145 views

How does threshold decryption with secretly shared exponents actually work?

Imagine the case where you have a sufficiently large finite field (or any multiplicative field for that matter) $\mathbb{Z}_{p}$ where p is some large prime. Now, I have a number $g \in \mathbb{Z}_{p}...
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3answers
363 views

Privacy of vote from tallying authority in El Gamal Voting Schemes

I've been reading this paper about ElGamal encryptions and its application in electronic voting: http://www.win.tue.nl/~berry/papers/euro97.pdf Section 2.3 talks about using Shamir secret sharing so ...
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63 views

Draw/Lottery with hidden but provable outcome?

I have a scenario in which one of n participants is to be assigned a positive value and all other participants a negative value. The outcome of the draw is to be known only by the respective ...
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190 views

E-voting: public tallying vs. vote selling

There are many design goals for an e-voting system. My question concerns a conflict between 2 particular goals: A voter should be able to verify that their vote was correctly tallied A voter should ...
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156 views

Oblivious Transfer in E-Voting

I'm having trouble understanding why and how an oblivious transfer (OT) is used in e-voting systems. According to many descriptions of OT's, a receiver (I suppose that's the ballot collector?) can ...
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1answer
488 views

Easy to implement proof of shuffle

I will be writing some code to implement a non interactive proof of shuffle. I intend to use it on a voting application that supports Borda voting. The voter must prove that her vote is valid, that is ...
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542 views

How to create a decentralized secret ballot among a small group of people?

A small (< 100) group wants to implement an election. For that, each participant must vote in one of N candidates. After everyone has voted, they must be able to determine a winner; yet, nobody ...
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47 views

Unique decentralized ID systems

We are all familiar with the standard decentralized ID system, the web of trust, e.g. for PGP keys. However, normal web of trust systems are unable to guarantee uniqueness — there's no practical limit ...
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67 views

Election communication protocol

I'm not a cryptography expert, but this seems like it falls into this area. Imagine I want to design an election system (senate race for example) where I send the exact same ballot of 100 candidates ...
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1answer
51 views

How to run a (provably probably) secure global referendum?

The following question is extremely broad and speculative, for which I apologize, but it strikes me as exceedingly important, so I will ask it nonetheless. Suppose an event of global significance ...
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426 views

How do voters verify a Helios (v3) election result?

So from my understanding of verification specification version 3, a Helios election proceeds as follows: A voter retrieves the system's public key to encrypt their vote & submit it. The voter ...
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1answer
195 views

Why doesn't this operation reveal the voter's message?

I am working my way through this paper. I am trying to figure out the OR zero knowledge proof in figure 2. The prover is verifying that she has correctly voted, and that her input satisfies $$\log_gx=\...
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314 views

Have I made any glaring mistakes in my use of Yao's garbled circuits?

I would like to use garbled circuits to provide a service that allows people to vote where they do not need to reveal their votes to my server or to anyone else. Let's assume that I have secure ways ...
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1answer
208 views

Anonymity problem after voting with blind signatures

In a distributed voting system (all the messages are public, but signed and maybe encrypted/blinded), having: $d$, $e$, $N$ — registrar key params $m$ — msg $r$ — random blinding factor $m'$ — ...
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649 views

Are there reasonably secure online voting implementations e.g. for student council elections?

Assume a university want to elect the student council. This was done via paper ballot and there is a need to reach more students for voting, so electronic voting is on the table. While researching ...
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Are there any real-world E-voting systems in use with the Paillier cryptosystem?

There are a lot of theories of Paillier cryptosystem with references to e-voting. Are there any real-world E-voting systems in use with the Paillier cryptosystem?
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220 views

Could eVoting on the bitcoin blockchain be done?

I'm basically a crypto noob (and not an english native), so please be indulgent :) I thought about if you could realize an eVoting system with bitcoin. I see 2 major requirements: each citizen can ...
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Voting protocol - How many dishonest tallying centres can the protocol cope with?

We have the voting protocol that is described here. I am looking at the following exercise: Determine how many dishonest tallying centres the protocol can cope with before the following properties ...
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988 views

An electronic voting system

This semester I am taking the course Cryptography. I will have a presentation about the topic "Voting Scheme". I am preparing myself by reading from the book “Cryptography : an Introduction” by N....
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During electronic voting, how does one hide the choice from Voting device?

Assume the following: I want to cast a vote during an election through an electronic voting system. For our system we make the assumption that the device one uses to cast the vote is potentially ...
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269 views

Voting system validation

I'm developing an application to run elections. A voting system. I would like to give the ability to the voters to check later if their vote were correct computed/casted. assumptions: each user has ...
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1answer
482 views

Proving correctness of a decryption of a homomorphically summed ciphertext?

I would like to take some additively homomorphic cryptosystem - don't care much which one for now - and encrypt a series of numbers with it. I would then like to (in public) take these numbers, add ...