Questions tagged [voting]

Voting is a method for a group such as a meeting or an electorate to make a decision or express an opinion.

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Why modified version of ElGamal is used on JCJ e-voting scheme?

I was reading the Coercion-Resistant Electronic Election paper and don't understand why the authors chose a modified version of ElGamal. I guess that it was for security reasons. If so, what are the ...
Alexander Vidaurre Arroyo's user avatar
2 votes
1 answer
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Prove with ZKP that I have encrypted a message $v + random\_number\cdot c$ given an RSA public key?

I want to create an application in which users can cast vote to blockchain in encrypted form using RSA. The private key will be revealed only after completion of the election. My major use case is as ...
P S's user avatar
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Trustless voting where the total number of votes each candidate get is kept private

Given n voters and p candidates, how can we design a trustless voting algorithm that satisfies the following properties. Each voter can only vote for exactly one candidate. The algorithm needs to: ...
Justin Zhang's user avatar
7 votes
2 answers
194 views

Providing tokens for anonymous survey

I want to conduct an anonymous Internet survey (e.g. “What’s your favorite fruit?” with a multiple choice answer) among a given set of people. Double answers by the same participant are not allowed. ...
Alfe's user avatar
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Is there a scheme for voting on decrypting a message with a variable voter count?

I am wondering if there might be a scheme for the following scenario: Let's suppose a government wants a truly democratic intelligence agency. For this the government publishes all intelligence ...
Franz Bauer's user avatar
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1 answer
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How can I distribute a set of anonymous tokens digitally among a known limited population to do anonymous voting?

TL:DR How can I give a population of N people the chance to randomly pick one token each person guaranteeing those: Nobody knows noone else's token. Noone can pick more than one token. Every person ...
Xavi Montero's user avatar
1 vote
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What issues does the following Distributed Shamir Secret Sharing scheme have?

What (obvious) security issues does the following "onion" Distributed Shamir Secret Sharing scheme on a blockchain for the purpose of e-voting have? The blockchain in this context, is an ...
desertkun's user avatar
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On a public e-voting, how do I keep the votes from being disclosed prematurely without a trustee?

I am trying1 to build a Proof Of Concept of a e-voting scheme on a blockchain. Before the elaboration, the question: On a public e-voting, how do I keep the votes from being disclosed prematurely ...
desertkun's user avatar
2 votes
1 answer
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Paillier versus Lifted ElGamal for homomorphic addition for e-voting

I'm looking to create an anonymous e-Voting system which will assign a certain number of bits to each candidate during a vote, e.g. 010000 for Alice, 000100 for Bob, and 000001 for Charlie. It works ...
ystark's user avatar
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Which are the current solutions to the illegal values in the homomorphic secret sharing?

There is a usual example about homomorphic secret sharing, focused on e-voting. Supposing we use Shamir's scheme for the Secret Sharing system, a participant generates a polynomial whose a0 is +1 (yes)...
FairLight's user avatar
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Model a dishonest majority controlled by several adversaries in a voting protocol?

In the context of secure multi-party computation protocols, when a dishonest majority is considered, it is assumed the worst case scenario, i.e., all the corrupted parties are controlled by the same ...
Lorenzo's user avatar
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What Digital Signature Scheme should we use?

My team wants to implement the ElectionGuard as the main part of an e-voting scheme (even if it is known that e-voting protocols are malleable; for the purposes of the voting scheme it is enough). ...
Lecter's user avatar
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2 votes
2 answers
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What is blindness and forgeability in Chaum's blind signature scheme?

I am going through the voting protocols. I know how blind signature works (Blind Signature), but why is blind signature - unconditionally ”blind”, conditionally ”unforgeable" (as highlighted in the ...
Adam Levine's user avatar
4 votes
1 answer
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Murder Mystery Party

For a "Murder Mystery Party", one person is chosen anonymously to be the murderer (i.e., only the murderer knows who the murderer is) by shuffling cards with everyone randomly taking a private card (...
bobuhito's user avatar
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Is "Bingo voting" insecure against a corrupt election authority?

I am reading about "Bingo voting" (Wikipedia, Paper), and I'm not understanding how it is secure against a corrupt election authority. If the election authority knows all the dummy votes $N_j^i$, ...
ATOMP's user avatar
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Maintaining validity of ZKP throughout re-randomization of homomorphic ciphertext without linkability to previous ciphertext

Question: How is it possible to adapt a ZKP for a homomorphic ciphertext to still be valid after said ciphertext has been re-randomized? Context: In a lot of e-voting systems homomorphic encryption ...
Mibokess's user avatar
2 votes
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Is there a scheme to force a party to generate a fresh key?

Is there a way to force one party to generate a fresh key, such that another party can be convinced that the key was freshly generated, without that party also knowing the key? I'm motivated by a ...
Atte Juvonen's user avatar
1 vote
1 answer
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Randomization attack in voting protocols

I'm looking into coercion-resistant voting schemes and one of the key elements of coercion-resistance is resistance to randomization attacks. Juels et al. define a randomization attack as one where ...
Atte Juvonen's user avatar
1 vote
1 answer
76 views

How to prove element equality in G1 using Groth-Sahai proofs

In the BeleniosRF e-voting scheme, Groth-Sahai proofs with the "Instantiation based on the SXDH assumption" are used (see https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/155, version 20160411:065033, page 24). In the ...
Simon Warta's user avatar
48 votes
2 answers
7k views

How is the Swiss post e-voting system supposed to work, and how was it wrong?

I read that the Swiss post had an e-voting solution developed, made it possible to obtain the source code for review, and that vulnerabilities were found. Apparently we are not talking about the ...
fgrieu's user avatar
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Any ideas to make an Electronic Voter Machine more secure? [closed]

EVMs are not secure they say. So how can we make it more secure tham the existing one using cryptography?
aashik's user avatar
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2 answers
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What is chain voting?

I read The Three Ballot Voting System by Rivest. This paper-based voting system can be attacked with chain voting. But can't find any description of what "Chain voting" is mentioned in section 4.9. ...
user10842694's user avatar
0 votes
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131 views

Helios voting system voting verification

In the decryption step in helios, why do we need Chaum-Pedersen to prove that a certain plaintext $m$ corresponds to a given ciphertext $c$? Why can we just encrypt $m$ and see if it's equal to $c$?
mip's user avatar
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Helios: Where are admin tools stated in the paper

I read the Helios Paper Helios: Web-based Open-Audit Voting. In section 4.4 Anonymization they are saying that "once the voting period ends" the admin can "shuffle" (re-encrypt and permutate), "...
Bogg's user avatar
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How might one create a system of election by lot (sortition) that is both secure and verifiable?

I've been puzzling recently over sortition, a democratic method of selection for public office which I find very fascinating. Basically, instead of choosing candidates like Hillary Clinton or Donald ...
Will 's user avatar
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3 answers
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Non-interactive public sum of private values

Suppose there is a large number of participants each with a secret value. The secret values are very large (e.g. 256-bit integers). Each participant has published a public commitment to their secret ...
irakliy's user avatar
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2 votes
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Why is this voting system not secure?

Why not have each person simply treated as a counterparty to an off-the-record chat? People show up in groups and show an ID which is cross-referenced against a central database to prevent Sybil ...
Gregory Magarshak's user avatar
2 votes
1 answer
431 views

Anonymity of Paillier cryptosystem in e-voting system

I'm not an expert so at the moment I'm trying to figure out (at high level) how such cryptosystem would exploit it's homomorphic properties to guarantee anonymity in a e-voting system. As far as i ...
Skary's user avatar
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Non interactive ZKP that encrypted additive elgamal message is in set of valid messages

This is taken from Anonymous voting by two-round public discussion by F. Hao P.Y.A. Ryan P. Zielinski Votes are encrypted using the additive variant of ElGamal. I am also using ECElgamal. The idea is ...
iH8WorkingWith.NetGraphics's user avatar
1 vote
1 answer
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Revealing vote after time

Imagine we have 5 different parties, all of these parties test if a particular thing is true or false over the course of 24 hours. The network needs to come to a consensus about the majority outcome ...
kam's user avatar
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1 vote
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Aggregating Votes

Voters may vote 0 or 1. We want to aggregate their votes, proving runs efficiently $O(n)$ in number of votes but verifying runs $O(1)$ or $O(\log n)$. Voting has to be cryptographically secure - no ...
Max Chamberlin's user avatar
0 votes
1 answer
149 views

Secure way to Tally Votes

I want to find a secure and efficient way to tally votes. Say we have N ~ 10000 voters. Each one can vote for candidate 1, candidate 0, or both. But no one can vote more than once. The groups who ...
Max Chamberlin's user avatar
4 votes
1 answer
199 views

Cryptographically secure shaming

I was thinking of the problem of naming&shaming, victims don't want to reveal themselves. Yet the public wants to know, and have some confidence in the veracity of statements. Such confidence ...
Meir Maor's user avatar
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1 vote
1 answer
152 views

Zero-knowledge voting with hidden weights

Assume a voting with delegates, where each delegate's vote $v_i \in \{-1,1\}$ has a certain weight $w_i$ depending on the number of people who elected the delegate. Is there a way to calculate the ...
Manuel Schmidt's user avatar
2 votes
0 answers
161 views

Estonian e-voting, vote verification system

I believe I do understand the basics of how the Estonian e-voting system works, but I'm stuck at their vote verification system. In order to get the vote verified, a client needs to encrypt all of the ...
user3697203's user avatar
2 votes
0 answers
176 views

How does threshold decryption with secretly shared exponents actually work?

Imagine the case where you have a sufficiently large finite field (or any multiplicative field for that matter) $\mathbb{Z}_{p}$ where p is some large prime. Now, I have a number $g \in \mathbb{Z}_{p}...
DaWNFoRCe's user avatar
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1 vote
3 answers
454 views

Privacy of vote from tallying authority in El Gamal Voting Schemes

I've been reading this paper about ElGamal encryptions and its application in electronic voting: http://www.win.tue.nl/~berry/papers/euro97.pdf Section 2.3 talks about using Shamir secret sharing so ...
Tola95's user avatar
  • 11
3 votes
0 answers
71 views

Draw/Lottery with hidden but provable outcome?

I have a scenario in which one of n participants is to be assigned a positive value and all other participants a negative value. The outcome of the draw is to be known only by the respective ...
Tobi Nary's user avatar
  • 371
7 votes
3 answers
212 views

E-voting: public tallying vs. vote selling

There are many design goals for an e-voting system. My question concerns a conflict between 2 particular goals: A voter should be able to verify that their vote was correctly tallied A voter should ...
Atte Juvonen's user avatar
2 votes
0 answers
184 views

Oblivious Transfer in E-Voting

I'm having trouble understanding why and how an oblivious transfer (OT) is used in e-voting systems. According to many descriptions of OT's, a receiver (I suppose that's the ballot collector?) can ...
user66875's user avatar
  • 183
2 votes
1 answer
609 views

Easy to implement proof of shuffle

I will be writing some code to implement a non interactive proof of shuffle. I intend to use it on a voting application that supports Borda voting. The voter must prove that her vote is valid, that is ...
Panagiotis Grontas's user avatar
15 votes
1 answer
579 views

How to create a decentralized secret ballot among a small group of people?

A small (< 100) group wants to implement an election. For that, each participant must vote in one of N candidates. After everyone has voted, they must be able to determine a winner; yet, nobody ...
MaiaVictor's user avatar
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1 vote
0 answers
50 views

Unique decentralized ID systems

We are all familiar with the standard decentralized ID system, the web of trust, e.g. for PGP keys. However, normal web of trust systems are unable to guarantee uniqueness — there's no practical limit ...
Elliot Gorokhovsky's user avatar
4 votes
0 answers
70 views

Election communication protocol

I'm not a cryptography expert, but this seems like it falls into this area. Imagine I want to design an election system (senate race for example) where I send the exact same ballot of 100 candidates ...
Gregable's user avatar
  • 141
0 votes
1 answer
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How to run a (provably probably) secure global referendum?

The following question is extremely broad and speculative, for which I apologize, but it strikes me as exceedingly important, so I will ask it nonetheless. Suppose an event of global significance ...
Sam Lichtenstein's user avatar
9 votes
1 answer
488 views

How do voters verify a Helios (v3) election result?

So from my understanding of verification specification version 3, a Helios election proceeds as follows: A voter retrieves the system's public key to encrypt their vote & submit it. The voter ...
Anthony Kraft's user avatar
3 votes
1 answer
209 views

Why doesn't this operation reveal the voter's message?

I am working my way through this paper. I am trying to figure out the OR zero knowledge proof in figure 2. The prover is verifying that she has correctly voted, and that her input satisfies $$\log_gx=\...
Rhyzomatic's user avatar
4 votes
1 answer
434 views

Have I made any glaring mistakes in my use of Yao's garbled circuits?

I would like to use garbled circuits to provide a service that allows people to vote where they do not need to reveal their votes to my server or to anyone else. Let's assume that I have secure ways ...
Rhyzomatic's user avatar
3 votes
1 answer
234 views

Anonymity problem after voting with blind signatures

In a distributed voting system (all the messages are public, but signed and maybe encrypted/blinded), having: $d$, $e$, $N$ — registrar key params $m$ — msg $r$ — random blinding factor $m'$ — ...
Inversion's user avatar
  • 133
12 votes
3 answers
711 views

Are there reasonably secure online voting implementations e.g. for student council elections?

Assume a university want to elect the student council. This was done via paper ballot and there is a need to reach more students for voting, so electronic voting is on the table. While researching ...
kei1aeh5quahQu4U's user avatar