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Results tagged with pkcs1
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user 452
PKCS#1 is the first standard published by RSA Security, which was setup by the inventors of RSA, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman. It describes how the RSA problem can be used to perform secure signature generation and encryption.
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Why do public keys for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 follow a normal distribution?
It's not perfectly clear what your graph is actually displaying.
However, if you expect that $k$-bit RSA keys are equidistributed between $2^{k-1}$ and $2^k$, well, that's not likely (unless the key …
- 151k
3
votes
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Is this Bleichenbacher '06 style signature forgery possible? (Or more like, why isn't it?)
Now, I'm wondering about the case where an implementation does check that the hash is right-justified, but doesn't check the previous bytes at all.
That case is completely broken for $e=3$
As …
- 151k
8
votes
Security of RSA-3072 with public exponent $2^{16}+1$
is it safe enough to do it with the above exponent (of 2^16+1), and are there any known vulnerabilities for scheme EMSA-PSS (RFC8017) or for scheme RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 done with this signature system? … Attack on the RSA padding method; however, PSS has a security proof that an attack here would not be significantly easier than an attack on the RSA problem, and while RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 does not have such …
- 151k