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I am not aware about a software doing what you're asking. Moreover I think it would be quite difficult to have a software testing for a generic implementation. It would be possible if there was a stan …

They use a different way, the encrypt the filename with AES-EME. EME (ECB-Mix-ECB) is a wide-block encryption mode developed by Halevi and Rogaway in 2003 [eme]. … EME-32 is a concrete implementation of EME with a fixed length of 32 AES blocks. …

One needs to have a key with the proper length to use the AES encryption algorithm. … Therefore an AES-256 with a 56-bit effective key length should not be considered as secure. …

Both set are generated using, of course, the same secret AES key. What are the important steps to modify an WB encryption project into a WB decryption project? … EDIT: more details are available on the AES standard publication at Section 5.3.5 where the Equivalent Inverse Cipher is described. Is there any WB AES decryption implementation for me to read? …

(this is very similar to the One Time Pad encryption, but with the random string generated by the AES) Reusing the counter with the same key means re-generating the same key-dependent random string, breaking … You could probably give a look to the AES-SIV construction, SIV stands for Syntetic IV where the nonce is generated from the message itself, rather than being an explicit input into the algorithm. …

The inverse in AES is defined over a particular field. All the operation are done in this field. The Rijndael finite field is defined as follow: $GF(2^8) = GF(2)[x]/(x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1)$. … There are several way to implement the inversion and the affine transformation described in the AES to get the final SBox. …

convert the Tux to PPM with Gimp # Then take the header apart head -n 4 Tux.ppm > header.txt tail -n +5 Tux.ppm > body.bin # Then encrypt with ECB (experiment with some different keys) openssl enc -aes …

Indeed, AES-GCM is defined as AES-CTR + GMAC as authentication code. … The difference is that AES-CTR does not provide integrity protection and an AuthTag has to be added (could be HMAC, or CBC-MAC for example); on the other side the AES-GCM provides both protection (confidentiality …

Yes IV is not intended to be secret. It is given in clear with the ciphertext (usually the first block of it). An attacker, given the ciphertext, can recover the first 128 bits, use them as the IV an …

It is quite easy, try to imagine if you have only one block of plaintext and you encrypt it under CFB or CTR with the same IV... (using the black box you can actually get the encryption of any IV of …

But, of course, this table would be ${HUGE}$ (e.g.: for the AES: $2^{128} \times 128$ bits, I don't even know how to write this quantity, but could be approximated by $2^{92}$ Terabytes). … Resume of white-box applied in AES algorithm (slides 18 - 24). …

obfuscation aims to hide the logic of the obfuscated algorithm, and usually, this is not the same security target of such situation you described, code obfuscation aims to hide that the obfuscated code is an AES … obfuscation in this context is used to hide how it is computed and in particular when/where the key is loaded in memory, data obfuscation is used to hide the link between some loaded data and the plain AES …

CFB works as a stream cipher, where the random stream is generated encrypting the previous block of ciphertext. Then, the plaintext is just xored with this random generated stream. To decrypt a pa …

No, you can't. A symmetric encryption scheme without a random IV is not sure at all. The scheme is deterministic. from wikipedia: In cryptography, an initialization vector (IV) or starting variable ( …

There is book Algebraic Aspects of the Advanced Encryption Standard thats gives a good algebraic description of the AES algorithm. …