4

That's insecure. In BLS signatures: for private key $x$ and public key $X = xP$, the signature is computed as $T = xS$, and the verification checks if $e(T, P) = e(S, X)$, which works because: $e(T, P) = e(xS, P) = e(xS, P) = e(S, P)^x$ $e(S,X) = e(S, xP) = e(S, P)^x$ If you know that $S = kP$, then you can forge a signature for a message with hash $k'$ ...


2

You can. Low-embedding degree may be bad due to the MOV attack, but pairing-friendly curves are particularly chosen so that the embedding degree is low but still enough to not decrease security. So any elliptic curve algorithm should be safe on the curve, not only pairing-based ones. Some observations: ECDSA if often used with NIST curves with cofactor 1. ...


1

It depends on whether the pairing is a type 1 pairing or some other type of pairing. In a type 1 pairing, $S$ is a multiple of $P$. In any other type of pairing, $S$ is not a multiple of $P$.


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