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This will depend on the key schedule of the design, but they are usually relatively simple expansion algorithms. In particular the initial round keys are often the actual bits of the cryptovariable and so recovering the initial round key recovers the first bits of cryptovariable (additional bits of cryptovariable can then be guessed exhaustively with less ...


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Provided that Shamir's secret sharing is implemented correctly, the attacker gains no advantage from knowing up to $k-1$ shares, and the size of the field does not matter. Yes, the attacker can carry out a brute force guessing attack to (possibly, given enough time) find the password. But they can do that even if the password isn't shared, and knowing up to ...


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Let the Shamir's Secret Sharing (SSS) is constructed from the finite field $K = \mathbb F_{p^m}$, i.e. $K$ is a finite field extension with $p^m$ elements, $order(K) = p^m$. When an attacker accesses the $k-1$ of the $k$ shares of SSS, the remaining all values from the $K$ have the same probability to be a candidate of the last share. This is due to the ...


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