New answers tagged

0

In moz://a SSL Configuration Generator both "Modern" and "Intermediate" configurations contain ciphers suites which simultaneously assure the confidentiality and authenticity of data (AEAD) as GCM does, but not only GCM does. See Poly1305 and Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) for details. In "Modern" mode only TLS 1.3 is enabled, where the ...


2

Kerberos uses des-cbc-hmac (mac and encrypt) and rc4-hmac-exp based on md5 (mac and encrypt I think) in their encryptions. Those encryptions are considered as weak and should not be used. Why are they considered as weak? What attacks can be launched against those encryptions? Regarding the ciphers: DES is considered to be a weak block cipher because the ...


0

$\text{AES-128}_d(C_1, K) \oplus \text{AES-128}_d(C_2, K) = P_1 \oplus P_2$ Doesn't that assume that the two ciphertexts share the same IV? Typically, they don't. In any case, even if you don't know any of the IVs, then a simpler method would be if you have a known two block message with plaintext $(P_a, P_b)$ and a corresponding ciphertext $(C_a, C_b)$, ...


0

Grover's algorithm would work against CBC. Do you mean you have several thousand plaintext/ciphertext messages, each with their own IV? I'm not sure what you're doing in step 2. I think generally the IV is considered part of the ciphertext, so if you have the ciphertext, you have the IV, and then you end up with equations like: AES-128$_d$(C$_1$, K) = IV $\...


Top 50 recent answers are included