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1

There have been similar "security breaches" where someone did indeed gather a lot of public RSA keys and successfully factored some of them using Euclid's algorithm. I believe the weakness was that a lot of implementations didn't use "random enough" RSA key generators (by using a cryptographically secure random number generator) and this resulted in some ...


7

No, the length extension attack/property is not considered a collision. It does not allow to build a collision. The length extension property is that given the hash of a bitstring $M$ of given length $l$ (but arbitrary and unknown content), it is possible to compute the hash of $M\mathbin\|F(l)\mathbin\|E$ with $F(l)$ a short bitstring deduced from the ...


1

Well, not exactly. The hash function that your MD internally uses a compression function $f:\{0,1\}^{256} \to \{0,1\}^{128}$ MD construction uses an IV, in your case 128-bit feed into the first call $f$. The first input and output of $f$ is $h_1 = f(IV\mathbin\|m_1)$. From these, you can deduce that you must divide your message $m$ into 128-bit blocks. ...


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