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9 votes

How can Blowfish be resistant against differential cryptanalysis if it doesn't have S-boxes tuned for that?

The short answer is to have more rounds. This article provides an equation to determine the number of chosen plaintexts required for a differential cryptographic attack on a Blowfish with multiple ...
hardyrama's user avatar
  • 2,268
3 votes

Midori block cipher design: importance of $S_b$ as the S-box

The lightweight Midori block cipher is a subtitution-permutation network where a round of cipher has a substitution phase where chunks of state are used as inputs to the $S$-box and the outputs ...
Daniel S's user avatar
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2 votes
Accepted

Is there any notion of key-recovery attacks security (perhaphs using games) that is equivalent to IND-CPA?

I don't think an equivalence proof can exist, unless you significantly change the key recovery definition. I don't think this is unexpected, since it seems natural that key recovery is harder than ...
K.G.'s user avatar
  • 4,817
1 vote
Accepted

How to evaluate the minimum complexity of the key recovery when the success probability p is given?

For common cryptographic algorithms, there is no known lower bound to the complexity of key recovery with a given (and sizable) probability. We can't mathematically exclude the possibility of a much ...
fgrieu's user avatar
  • 144k
1 vote
Accepted

Where did the number of initial plaintexts required for impossible cryptanalysis on Mini-AES came from?

The number of the initial plaintext $2^{13}$ was chosen to satisfy the final equation: so using all the probabilites mentioned in the paper and if we put $2^{x-7}$ instead of $2^{6}$ in the final ...
siba36's user avatar
  • 301
1 vote

Differential uniformity of vectorial Boolean function

Not much can be said in general. For example take the APN function (defined over the field instead of the vector space, clearly this makes no difference to diff. uniformity) $$ f:GF(2^n) \rightarrow ...
kodlu's user avatar
  • 23.1k
1 vote

Heys Differential Cryptanalysis Question

So to attack those keys you need to create high probability input differences confined to $S_{41}$ and $S_{43}$. Taking the same input differences as in Heys for $S_{42}$ and $S_{43}$ and working ...
kodlu's user avatar
  • 23.1k

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