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For why the model assumes adversaries can read the decrypted version of the sectors they can change (meaning they get access to a sector decryption oracle), see SEJPM's answer. For how adversaries can get read access to data they should not: these things have happened, and history repeats itself. In my teenage, I got access¹ to a business school's timeshare ...


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I understand that an adversary is capable of modifying an unused sector, but can anyone explain how they would be able to request its decryption? The first thing to understand here is that this is an adversary model. In cryptography we model our adversaries so we know exactly what capabilities they have and which they don't. In this particular case it seems ...


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G'day. LUKS stores multiple copies of the master key in what it terms key slots. Each key-slot contains an encrypted copy of the master key, and it can vary in its password-based KDF parameters (and even algorithms). The parameters and algorithms can sometimes be wildly different, giving rise to the circumstance where forcing one key-slot may be infeasible, ...


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