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4

In short, TPMFail attack is black-box timing analysis of TPM 2.0 devices deployed on computers. The TPMfail team is able to extract the private authentication key of TPMS's 256-bit private keys for ECDSA and ECSchnorr signatures, even over networks. This attack successful since there was secret dependent execution in TPMs that causes the timing attacks. To ...


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Actually you are both wrong, assuming that each user wants to authenticate themselves individually and / or establish private conversations between pairs. Unfortunately this is assumption is missing from the question. If everybody is using (EC)DH then they need a key pair each to setup communication by establishing a session key. That means 10 times 2 keys = ...


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Depends if "between themselves" means that they are sort of in a simple group-chat scenario. Then one private-public-key pair (i.e. RSA) would theoretically suffice (not factoring in the security), because they can all encrypt messages with the public key and decrypt messages with the private key that they all have an identical pair of it. In actual group-...


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TPM-Fail is a new demonstration of the well-known lattice-based attack of Howgrave-Graham and Smart on DLOG-based signature schemes such as Elgamal, Schnorr, and DSA that exploits partial information about per-signature secrets. TPM-Fail specifically applies the attack with timing side channels from the cryptogrpahy decelerators in TPMs. The attack had ...


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Let's take a look at this from a higher level of view. In asymmetric cryptography, private keys provide some form of authentication. Let $(e, d)$ be a public/private key pair respectively of a secure asymmetric encryption scheme $E$, and let $c = E_e(m)$ be the ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext $m$. If one is able to recover $m$ from $c$, then it's ...


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