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I'll try to take a stab at this. From Apple's iOS Security Guide, we learn that The metadata of all files in the file system is encrypted with a random key, which is created when iOS is first installed or when the device is wiped by a user. The file system key is stored in Effaceable Storage. Since it’s stored on the device, this key is not used to ...

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You asked for the practical impact, so the answer is that for \$120 I could probably have your entire password database done by tomorrow. Here is your program, or something similar to it: using System; using System.Text; using System.Security.Cryptography; class Program { static void Main(string[] args) { byte[] pwd = new byte[128]; ... 41 The best you can hope for is the following: You derive the password into a "big enough" (e.g. 128 bits) secret key$K$with a Key Derivation Function like PBKDF2. There are some details to be aware of (see below). You use the secret key$K$as seed for a Pseudorandom Number Generator. The PRNG is deterministic (same seed implies same output sequence) and ... 26 From what you have described, it sounds like your system works as follows: Consult the system clock to find a 32-bit seed$s$. Use System.Random to generate a passphrase$p = G(s)$. (Here$G$is shorthand for whatever computation happens inside System.Random.) Hash the passphrase with PBKDF(2?) into output$x = H(p, \sigma)$, where$\sigma$is a salt known ... 25 Both PBKDF2 and scrypt are key derivation functions (KDFs) that implement key stretching by being deliberately slow to compute and, in particular, by having an adjustable parameter to control the slowness. The difference is that scrypt is also designed to require a large (and adjustable) amount of memory to compute efficiently. The purpose of this is to ... 25 Coming up with a specific number is hard. Realistically, all three options take you well out of the realm of ever having more than the absolute worst passwords brute-forced by an attacker. The primary gain of scrypt and argon2 over bcrypt is a hit to parallelism due to the addition of memory requirements. GPUs with thousands of cores will need (but don't ... 25 Using Base64/HEX has nothing to do with security of a hash algorithm. Base64 and HEX are ways to represent binary data, which is the actual output of a hash algorithm. Base64 is shorter simple because it uses a larger charset than HEX. (64 characters vs 16 characters) Besides, algorithms like SHA-256 and SHA-512 are only "unsafe" when used for password ... 23 The algorithms themselves just output binary (i.e. bytes) if you read their specifications. It's the implementation in API's and applications that output the hexadecimals and/or base64. Sometimes there are also ad hoc standards / common practice that specifies a certain output format. This is for instance the case for the output of the bcrypt password ... 21 Cryptographic hashes are designed to be fast and collision resistant. It turns out that when hashing passwords, it is more secure to have a slow hash function. One way to make a fast hash function slow is to iterate it. Like is done here. Think about it this way. If an attacker is able to compute a million hash calculations in a second, if you only ran your ... 19 The HKDF paper provides as good a summary as any: A Key derivation function (KDF) is a basic and essential component of cryptographic systems: Its goal is to take a source of initial keying material, usually containing some good amount of randomness, but not distributed uniformly or for which an attacker has some partial knowledge, and derive from it one ... 18 No. A MAC guarantees unforgeability but not pseudorandomness. It is true that all MACs that I can think of right now are essential pseudorandom functions, but this does not mean that the MAC definition implies this. Indeed, it clearly does not. So, conceptually, you need a pseudorandom function. You can assume that HMAC is a pseudorandom function. It is ... 18 The official documentation for System.Random explicitly says it should not be used for generating passwords. It’s predictable, and seeded only from the system clock. This means System.Random has at most 20 bits of entropy to anyone who has a clock accurate to within a second. Indeed, try creating two new instances in quick succession on different threads; ... 17 What you suggest is valid. Here is a way to show it: In a fully implemented signature system (things are similar for asymmetric encryption), there are three modules: a key pair generator, which produces a pseudo-random key pair; a signature generator, which uses the private key to produce a signature over some piece of data; a signature verifier, which ... 17 OpenPGP's "Iterated and Salted S2K" is just a single hash instance over a very long input, which consists in the repeated concatenation of the salt and the password. This is extremely GPU-friendly, especially when using a hash function which is built over 32-bit elementary operations (this category includes MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256 and RIPEMD-160; GPU are not as ... 16 Even if the 32 characters are completely random, they won't contain non-printable characters. Actually, there are only about 107 printable characters in ASCII (out of 256 values for a full byte) and that even includes the space character. So if all the printable characters are used, it would result to a security level of about$log_2(107^{32}) = 215$bits, ... 16 The encryption key isn't derived only from the passcode; it's also derived from a number of cryptographic keys etched directly into the CPU's silicon. These keys are impossible to read out in software—there are only instructions to encrypt and decrypt with them—and have been made purposefully difficult to extract by inspecting the hardware. Without the ... 16 The "s2k" options correspond to the String-to-Key specifiers. An s2k transform turns a human-compatible symmetric secret (a password or passphrase) into a symmetric key suitable for a symmetric encryption or MAC algorithm. Turning passwords into keys is tricky business because passwords that human can remember and accept to type tend to be weak with regards ... 15 KDF must produce results that have certain randomness properties, and be very difficult to reverse. Password hashes only need to satisfy the property "difficult to reverse", without randomness requirements. This is why all KDFs work as password hashes but not the other way around. 14 First, realize that PBKDF2 is PKCS #5 is RFC 2898, i.e. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2898.txt It's essentially an algorithm to securely hash a password as many times as you want, with whatever hash you want. OWASP recommends hashing the password at least 64,000 times in 2012, and doubling that every two years, per https://www.owasp.org/index.php/... 14 Yes, this is a fine approach. This sort of technique is known as "key separation". Since your master key is a cryptographically secure key, you do not need to use a large iteration count. Also, you could use any PRF, in place of PBKDF2. (The iteration count is normally used if you are applying PBKDF2 to a passphrase, instead of a cryptographically secure ... 14 SHA-512 has both a larger internal state and a higher number of rounds than SHA-256 - which means that it provides a higher bit strength. Somewhat surprisingly it may also outperform SHA-256, as it uses 64 bit word size, which works best on 64 bit processors. You can see a good comparison table on Wikipedia If less bits are required from SHA-512 then they ... 14 In principle raw SHA2 is suitable for deriving an AES key from a DH shared secret. But the "proper" solution is to use a KDF. My preferred choice is HKDF, which can use SHA256 as the underlying hash function. It allows you to derive several named key and keys longer than 256 bits from a single secret. 14 Yes. Actually any cryptographic hash function should be fine and allow you to reduce the problem of breaking your AES encryption to either: breaking your DH protocol, this follows from the fact that secure hash functions are meant to be "one-way" function. brute-forcing the AES key, since the output of a good hash function is distributed uniformly at ... 13 Yes, it is. PBKDF2 derives a DK, a "derived key", which is indistinguishable from random. This is mainly because function within PBKDF2 is HMAC, and HMAC is a PRF. Let's see the definition from Wikipedia: In cryptography, a pseudorandom function family, abbreviated PRF, is a collection of efficiently-computable functions which emulate a random oracle in ... 13 can any block cipher in CTR mode be used as a CSPRNG? Formally speaking the CTR mode transforms a PRF (or a PRP) into a PRG and as the PRP notion is the standard notion to model block ciphers, pretty much all secure block ciphers should yield a secure PRG when used in CTR mode. Less formally speaking CTR mode transforms a secure block cipher into a secure ... 13 Assume you have an IND-CCA secure cryptosystem$E$that runs a password through a slow KDF and implicitly handles salts and random IVs, a human-chosen password$p$, and messages$m_1$through$m_n$to encrypt. Is$E_p(m_1+m_2+\cdots+m_n)$or$E_p(m_1)+E_p(m_2)+\cdots+E_p(m_n)$better for this? Each invocation of$E$is slow due to it running a KDF on$p$, ... 12 I'd use HKDF's "expand" step to generate multiple keys from one masterkey. Use PBKDF2 to derive that masterkey from the password and salt. i.e. replace the "extract" step of HKDF with PBKDF2. //Extract MasterKey = PBKDF2(salt, password, iterations) //Expand AES-Key = HMAC(MasterKey, "AES-Key" | 0x01) MAC-Key = HMAC(MasterKey, "MAC-Key" | 0x01) (where | ... 12 The shared secret generated by the Diffie–Hellman key exchange is a random element of the subgroup of the multiplicative group modulo$p$generated by$g$. In particular, for$g$and$p$chosen as specified in RFC 2631 section 2.2, i.e. so that$p = jq+1$, where$q$and$p$are both prime,$j$is a small number (often 2, making$p$as safe prime) and$g\$ ...

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A common approach is to encrypt the private key with a symmetric key derived from a pass phrase. This will be as secure as the chosen pass phrase. I'd suggest sticking with this approach; its conventionality makes it "simpler" than a solution that hasn't been studied well.

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For the purpose of key diversification (that is, assigning a unique key per device), a true master_key is customary; that is, one with plenty of entropy (like, 128 bits or more random bits). Edit: that's now stated in the question. With that caveat, yes, PBKDF2(password=master_key, salt=serial_number, rounds=1000, dkLen=16)is appropriate to generate one 128-...

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