8
votes
What is the security concept in printer cartridge?
A company can make more money if the printers it sells only work with the cartridges they sell, which does not work if there is competition. It's cheaper to force a vendor lock-in than it is to ...
4
votes
In what sense are silicon PUFs unclonable?
At least in the Intel ISSCC 2014 paper, including with access to the 7 figures, I do not see that the PUF block has any kind of variable input. The aim of the PUF and accompanying circuitry seems to ...
4
votes
In what sense are silicon PUFs unclonable?
The answer lies in "complexity", but I do not believe they are unclonable in the explicit sense, but I can think of ways to get data out depending on how they are made. It is easy for me to see "ROM" ...
3
votes
Why is SRAM PUF considered weak PUF?
In the article, "weak PUFs" are for key storage, and "strong PUFs" are for authentication, but both are PUFs. It's just a function of how you use them. A 32-bit PUF is just a ...
2
votes
What is the security concept in printer cartridge?
The chip user doesn't really do any PUFy stuff. PUF manipulation is not entirely deterministic, so the stochastic methods used to convert that to determinism are hidden within the bowels the ChipDNA ...
2
votes
Accepted
How can PUF hardware be proportional to the number of challenge/response bits?
To implement challenge-response in ROM only (no computations), you basically need a lookup table, a mapping from challenges to responses. So for a $k$ bit challenge, you would need $2^k$ entries in ...
1
vote
What machine learning accuracy is assumed to be predictable for TRNG/PUF application?
By the definition of the next bit test any adversary (ML or not) able to guess the next bit of the output with probability non-negligibly greater than 50% is a break. So 60% is horribly broken.
...
1
vote
What machine learning accuracy is assumed to be predictable for TRNG/PUF application?
No we still idealistically target 50% inter hamming distance for PUFs, but being probabilistic and cumulative it's not set in stone. It's just that you achieve 100% material efficiency at 50%. Or you ...
1
vote
Ring oscillator based PUF
note: I am unsure that you can get an answer for your question as there's not enough technical information in the paper to reproduce (for me anyway) the results. However, you could work through it in ...
1
vote
How does PUF hardware help in software activation?
You're right about hardware activation devices for desktop applications. Dangling dongles outa your printer port is quite legacy. New applications tend to use some form of on-line activation system. ...
1
vote
Accepted
Why is SRAM PUF considered weak PUF?
Strong SRAM PUFs exist, and this is the way a strong PUF device is designed. The challenge (for response) is the access pattern. SRAM tends to be contiguous, so partitioning into CRPs can be easy if ...
1
vote
Accepted
What stops a physical attacker to use a dumped uninitialized SRAM with SRAM-PUF?
Does it mean that the response is only derived from the content of the SRAM in an uninitialized state?
For the raw RAM-PUF response, that's my understanding. How that is turned into a stable value (...
1
vote
Applicability of physical unclonable functions for public-key cryptography
Caveat: my understanding of Physically Unclonable Functions is partial, and my limited exposure to would-be PUF systems is old. I offer a tentative current opinion, hopping there will be constructive ...
1
vote
How is the inter and the intra distance of a PUF calculated?
I believe Roel Maes gives a very good answer to your question in his PhD thesis, pages 20-23.
In essence, ideally, you need to calculate an array of the Hamming Distance between every pair of ...
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