51
votes
Accepted
How is the Swiss post e-voting system supposed to work, and how was it wrong?
In the Swiss Post electronic voting protocol, after voters submit ballots, they are scrambled individually and shuffled together so that they cannot be traced back to voters to find who voted for whom—...
17
votes
How is the Swiss post e-voting system supposed to work, and how was it wrong?
The problem was the poor design of the scheme, specifically the part for universal verifiability.
As the paper Ceci n’est pas une preuve states:
To guarantee anonymity of the votes the scheme makes ...
- 6,326
13
votes
Accepted
Are there reasonably secure online voting implementations e.g. for student council elections?
In short, my answer is no; keep paper ballot, they have essential virtues unmatched by electronic substitutes; in particular, giving voters confidence that the result of the vote is not grossly ...
- 125k
10
votes
Any ideas to make an Electronic Voter Machine more secure?
We can't make satisfactory Electronic Voting Machines. Their design face conflicting goals that are impossible to reconcile, even in the simplest conceivable use case: a yes/no vote, a single machine.
...
- 125k
7
votes
Accepted
An electronic voting system
Full disclosure: In 2007 I founded an association aiming at voting transparency. I'm proud that my efforts may have had some role, however small, in the fact that the number of French cities using ...
- 125k
7
votes
Accepted
Have I made any glaring mistakes in my use of Yao's garbled circuits?
Unfortunately, the answer to your question is yes. You have made glaring mistakes. In particular, Yao's garbled circuits are suited for two-party computation only, and here you wish to carry out a ...
- 27k
5
votes
Accepted
Cryptographically secure shaming
There is a very recent paper that solves this problem at a large scale using secure computation techniques:
How to (not) share a password: Privacy preserving protocols for finding heavy hitters ...
- 10.8k
5
votes
How to create a decentralized secret ballot among a small group of people?
Electronic voting schemes constitute a big area of cryptographic research. The problem is complicated and multifaceted, and there are still no end-to-end secure schemes that provide desirable ...
- 655
5
votes
Accepted
How do voters verify a Helios (v3) election result?
How does an average voter know that his vote actually counted? He doesn't have any way of performing the summation and obtaining the private key to decrypt.
This is not actually true. He does have a ...
- 37.8k
4
votes
What is chain voting?
After a small search; it is a vote buying scheme.
Chain voting, a vote buying scheme in which a crook gives the voter a pre-voted ballot, the voter votes that ballot, and then after leaving the ...
- 43.5k
4
votes
Accepted
Why is this voting system not secure?
Unfortunately, most of the reasons that e-voting is not popular have nothing to do with the integrity of the underlying mathematics. This makes the question slight moot on a cryptography forum, but ...
- 14k
3
votes
Are there reasonably secure online voting implementations e.g. for student council elections?
You shouldn't use advanced crypto nor specialist algorithms here else you will be seriously over engineering and actually increasing the risks you face not reducing them. Seasoned security engineers ...
- 615
3
votes
E-voting: public tallying vs. vote selling
The second property is formally called receipt freeness. Any voting system based on probabilistic encryption cannot be receipt free, because the voter uses a random value to construct the vote, this ...
3
votes
Easy to implement proof of shuffle
Andrew Neff's verifiable shuffle scheme A Verifiable Secret Shuffle and its Application to E-Voting is implemented by the DeDiS Advanced Crypto Library for Go
A working example program that uses the ...
- 51
3
votes
Accepted
Non interactive ZKP that encrypted additive elgamal message is in set of valid messages
The standard solution is to use a proof of encryption of zero, coupled with an or proof and a careful choice of ciphertexts.
A proof of encryption of zero is a proof that the decryption of a ...
- 4,412
2
votes
Accepted
Anonymity problem after voting with blind signatures
The problem is, that you are actually checking a tautology and this is no danger to deanonymization. Let me explain it to you with a simple example of 2 signatures:
Lets say we want to blindly sign ...
- 12.1k
2
votes
Accepted
Could eVoting on the bitcoin blockchain be done?
Yes, it could be done. However, it would work a little different from what you imagine.
The government can create a new blockchain operating under zerocoin rules. The government could then distribute ...
- 573
2
votes
An electronic voting system
I thought that the structure of the presentation would be as followed.
One of the basic tools that are used by the most cryptographic protocols of electronic voting are the Zero-Knowledge proofs. ...
- 193
2
votes
Voting system validation
Just to say you have tons of literature about that.
If you need an entry point check out some papers here for instance:
http://esorics2014.pwr.wroc.pl/page2/index.html#15
Read the introductions and ...
2
votes
Voting system validation
It can guarantee the integrity, because you can not fake another voting with the same hash.
However, this only shows the ballot is casted correctly, but does not prove the ballot is correctly counted....
- 21
2
votes
Accepted
Why doesn't this operation reveal the voter's message?
I figured it out, it's quite simple actually.
The $d$ values (and $r$ values) are all exponents and chosen from $\mathbb{Z}_q$. Thus all calculations on them directly take place in $\mathbb{Z}_q$. ...
- 215
2
votes
Accepted
How might one create a system of election by lot (sortition) that is both secure and verifiable?
I'm going to try to answer a more modest version of your question.
Imagine that the Dishonest Society, a small club of 100 members, needs to take care of an Arduous Task that will require 5 people to ...
- 478
1
vote
Any ideas to make an Electronic Voter Machine more secure?
I will give some links;
E-voting experiments end in Norway amid security fears
If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it: Australia should stay away from electronic voting
DEFCON 25 Voting Machine Hacking ...
- 43.5k
1
vote
Accepted
Anonymity of Paillier cryptosystem in e-voting system
You've discovered some of the challenges of secure electronic voting. As you can see, merely having a cipher that allows you to confidentially tally numbers is not sufficient to conduct a secure ...
- 19.2k
1
vote
Non-interactive public sum of private values
If all the participants have a random secret key which sums to 0. They can each post the sum of their key with their number. Anyone can then some the values posted, the key will cancel out and we what ...
- 10.6k
1
vote
Revealing vote after time
Based on @Cort Ammon suggestion and some additional consultation i think the below will work
Each of the 5 parties could publish Hash(vote || random bytes), because of the random bytes it would ...
- 11
1
vote
Zero-knowledge voting with hidden weights
One approach might be the usage of a homomorphic cryptosystem like the Paillier cryptosystem, while the specific protocol properties depend on your use case.
For more detailed description of Paillier ...
- 116
1
vote
Privacy of vote from tallying authority in El Gamal Voting Schemes
For Shamir sharing scheme, an individual authority can only decrypt his share of anything is has, including individual voter ballot. With this scheme, such a share would give no information about the ...
- 2,237
1
vote
Privacy of vote from tallying authority in El Gamal Voting Schemes
The random $b,e$ values would seem to allow the uniform randomisation of the message between $G$ and $G^{-1}$.
Also, while reading a technical article at this level, one can note the citing of ...
- 16.6k
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