You haven't specified what security properties you want, but let's say it's random oracle indifferentiability of the hash function given an underlying short-input hash function $H$ like SHAKE128-256, which serves for preimage resistance, second-preimage resistance, and collision resistance (and therefore forgery detection), and collision resistance. (This This also works if you randomize $H$ and use $H_r$ instead, like KMAC128, which obviates anythe need for collision resistance even in signature applications.)
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Give quantitative details of transmission costs for realistic parameter sizes.
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\ell is already \log_2 of the length in chunks; get the logarithms straight.
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