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Assume Alice and Bob communicate over an insecure channel using one-time perfectly-secret encryption together with one-time secure message authentication code. Say Eve has the ability to eavesdrop and to inject messages into this insecure channel, but not to block or delay messages (i.e. Eve can mostly only replay authenticated encrypted messages).

Of course we can design scenario damaging to Alice and/or Bob. How can they protect themselves against such replay attacks?

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  • $\begingroup$ For a full protocol that works well in this scenario, look at CurveCP. It's design goals explicitly take your scenario into account. $\endgroup$ Commented Oct 8, 2012 at 19:44
  • $\begingroup$ @CodesInChaos Are you referring to CurveCP's use of nonces, aka number used once? I only added this comment because the current highest voted answer gives a similar answer. $\endgroup$ Commented Oct 9, 2012 at 2:41
  • $\begingroup$ @HeatfanJohn Both the use of nonces and that no forged packet can disrupt the connection. $\endgroup$ Commented Oct 9, 2012 at 6:21

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