I'm currently reading the book "A Pragmatic Introduction to Secure Multi-Party Computation". On pages 103-104 I came across the following related to the Cut-and-Choose technique:
If $P_2$ sees inconsistent outputs, then it is obvious to $P_2$ that $P_1$ is misbehaving. It is tempting to suggest that $P_2$ should abort in this case. However, to do so would be insecure! Suppose $P_1$’s incorrect circuits are designed to be selectively incorrect in a way that depends on $P_2$’s input. For example, suppose an incorrect circuit gives the wrong answer if the first bit of $P_2$’s input is 1. Then, $P_2$ will only see disagreeing outputs if its first bit of input is 1. If $P_2$ aborts in this case, the abort will then leak the first bit of its input. So we are in a situation where $P_2$ knows for certain that $P_1$ is cheating, but must continue as if there was no problem to avoid leaking information about its input.
To add some context to the above. They are referring to the naive Cut-and-Choose technique where $P_1$ is the garbled circuit generator and $P_2$ is the evaluator. So $P_1$ generates a bunch of GC for the preagreed function $f$ and sends them to $P_2$. Then $P_2$ chooses which of them to open based on a random coin and tells $P_1$ to open them, e.g. send all the corresponding wire labels (keys) for $P_2$ to be able to reconstruct the Look-up Table and check if it is equal to the pre-agreed one.
How can $P_1$ create an incorrect circuit that depends on the $P_2$ input so it can reveal information about it?
