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I'm looking for a proof of this theorem

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  • $\begingroup$ Just think about an attack. It can be terribly costly and have negligible success probability. However, if you find such an attack that proves that the scheme is not information-theoretically secure. If you can figure out a generic attack that works for all PKE schemes you are done. $\endgroup$ – mephisto Jul 4 '18 at 9:43
  • $\begingroup$ PKE schemes are not uncoditionally (or perfectly, or theoretically, or whatever you prefer) secure accroding to Shannon's Theorem. I'm looking for a formal proof $\endgroup$ – Luigi2405 Jul 4 '18 at 9:55
  • $\begingroup$ Do you know of a formal proof of Shannon's theorem? (You can find that anywhere with 3s of research, it's probably on Wikipedia). A formal proof of this theorem will in particular be a formal proof that no PKE scheme is unconditionnally secure. $\endgroup$ – Geoffroy Couteau Jul 4 '18 at 12:09
  • $\begingroup$ @GeoffroyCouteau 3 seconds? I've found it in just 2.. when I was looking for that. I'm interested in another theorem but luckly someone has understood me $\endgroup$ – Luigi2405 Jul 4 '18 at 15:33
  • $\begingroup$ You are interested in "another theorem"? You explicitly stated that you are looking for a proof that no PKE can be unconditionally secure. Which is exactly an immediate corollary of Shannon's theorem about perfect secrecy (Cédric essentially re-proved Shannon's theorem for the specific case of public-key encryption in his (good) answer below). It seems to me that you were looking for an explanation of Shannon's theorem in the specific case of PKE, not for a formal proof of Shannon's theorem - or are we not talking about the same theorem of Shannon? Anyway, if you got your answer, it's fine :) $\endgroup$ – Geoffroy Couteau Jul 4 '18 at 15:43
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I will just turn @mephisto's comment into a longer answer.

The following attack will work against any public-key encryption scheme:

  • The attacker has access to the public key and, say, a ciphertext encrypting some unknown message
  • for every possible secret key (by enumerating the key space), the attacker does the following:
    • checking whether the secret key does correspond to the known public key (for instance, by encrypting every single possible message then trying to decrypt them using this secret key)
    • when a secret key was found that passed the test of the previous step, the attacker uses it to decrypt the message

Of course this attack will take a gigantic amount of resources, but it will work against any PKE. Now this goes against the idea of perfect secrecy which says that getting a ciphertext gives no information about the plaintext, even for an adversary with unbounded resources.

Note how such attack will not work against the one-time-pad: an adversary attacking a one-time-pad only gets a ciphertext, there is no public key. If the adversary picks a random key, betting that it is the key that was used for encryption, it has no way to tell whether it was right or wrong in picking this key.

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    $\begingroup$ No, now he did your homework :-P $\endgroup$ – mephisto Jul 5 '18 at 8:18
  • $\begingroup$ Of course he did. Now go back and do yours :) $\endgroup$ – Luigi2405 Jul 5 '18 at 12:46

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