From my understanding, if an attacker is able to decrypt a session key which was encrypted through a public key, then the attacker practically has the corresponding private key pair.
Effectively yes, however only for that single message. Note that session keys are chosen independently and so leaking one doesn't allow you to guess any others. The public key encryption is also independently randomized preventing efficient recovery from the known plaintext. Then, as soon as you consider more than one message, leaking a strict subset of session keys is not as powerful as leaking the private key once.
If you're looking for a scenario where recovery of the session key is sometimes possible but recovery of the private key is not consider the following:
Suppose you run on an old copy of Debian with a weak RNG. Further suppose that you want to send a message to somebody else running a modern copy of Debian who also generated their private key on that modern copy. Now because of the RNG bug, you accidentally pick a weak session key and encrypt it. You then send a message which gets observed by an adversary knowing you run old Debian and brute-forces the session key exploiting the bad RNG output. Now your message has leaked, but no messages from other parties using good RNGs leaked.
If this is "too far-fetched" replace the Debian RNG bug in the above explanation with say a Spectre side-channel leaking the session key.