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Results tagged with multiparty-computation
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Multi-party computation (MPC) allows a set of parties, each with a private input, to securely and jointly perform any computation over their inputs.
1
vote
Accepted
LSB extraction in MPC: Doubts about correctness
The protocol is only designed to work when $a$ is in the range $\{-2^{k-1},\dots,2^{k-1}-1\}$. This ensures that $c$ doesn't overflow mod $p$, as long as $p$ is sufficiently large.
In the paper they e …
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2
votes
Accepted
SPDZ- How to do secure equality comparison
To test whether a secret value $[x]$ is zero, where $x \in [0,2^k-1]$, SPDZ uses the following blueprint, based on the method of Catrina and de Hoogh:
Take a secret preprocessed value $[r]$, where $ …
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3
votes
Accepted
Communication Complexity of Equality comparison (Catrina and de Hoogh)
What does an invocation mean?
The communication cost of opening 1 secret-shared field element.
Since the protocols of Catrina and de Hoogh are mostly independent of the underlying MPC protocol, …
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3
votes
Testing whether a secret value is zero without security bits (in SPDZ)
Secure zero-testing without working in a large field can be done with a protocol by Lipmaa and Toft, and with similar efficiency to the Catrina and de Hoogh protocols.
The basic idea is to open $m = …
- 731
3
votes
Accepted
How can Cleve's 1/r lower bound on the bias of coin-flipping protocols hold if parties can o...
In a multi-party protocol, if every honest party just outputs a random bit, it's likely they won't all output the same bit and the protocol would be incorrect.
With two parties, the corrupt party can …
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1
vote
Accepted
BGV KeyGen-- Can a maliciously-generated secret-shared key break security (e.g. SPDZ)?
Short answer: I don't know of any practical attack that exploits a malicious key generation protocol to, say, learn something about an encrypted message. However, I imagine this is highly context-depe …
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