Assuming the inputs and outputs are random, you would expect:
$$\begin{align}
P[\operatorname{SHA1}(s_1) \not= \operatorname{SHA1}(s_2)] &= 1 - 2^{-160} \\
P[\operatorname{SHA1}^2(s_1) \not= \operatorname{SHA1}^2(s_2)] &= (1 - 2^{-160})^2 \\
... \\
P[\operatorname{SHA1}^n(s_1) \not= \operatorname{SHA1}^n(s_2)] &= (1 - 2^{-160})^n \approx 1 - n/2^{160}, \\
\end{align}$$
where $\operatorname{SHA1}^2 = \operatorname{SHA1} \circ \operatorname{SHA1}$, etc.
Thus, $P[\operatorname{SHA1}^{10^9}(s_1) = \operatorname{SHA1}^{10^9}(s_2)] \approx 10^9 / 2^{160} \approx 2^{-130}$.
That's for a single pair $s_1 \not= s_2$. If you are looking for collisions, you would expect a collision with $\operatorname{SHA1}^{10^9}$ after something like $2^{130/2} = 2^{65}$ strings.
This approximation only holds while $n$ is small enough, and breaks down when it gets close to $2^{80}$ and cycles start to become an issue. However, for $10^9$ it should do all right.
However, there are (theoretical) attacks to find collisions in SHA1 faster, so for non-random inputs the probabilities could be higher.