Consider 3 parties, Alice, Bob and Charlie. Suppose each party has a bit as input, i.e. Alice, Bob and Charlie hold $a, b, c \in \{0, 1\}$ respectively. Show how construct a scheme with which they can compute the function $f (a, b, c) = a \oplus b \oplus c$ such that the following are satisfied:

(1) All parties learn $f(a, b, c)$ at the end.

(2) No party can learn more about the other party's input than what they can infer from $f(a, b, c)$ and choosing their own input wisely.

My attempt: A chooses $r_1,r_2\in\{0,1\}$, B chooses $s_1,s_2,\in\{0,1\}$, and C chooses $t_1,t_2\in\{0,1\}$ randomly. Then dealer of respective secrets (bold) distribute 3 shares to each party in the following manner.

$A: \it{\bf{a\oplus r_1 \oplus r_2}}, s_1, t_1$

$B: r_1, \it{\bf{b\oplus s_1 \oplus s_2}}, t_2$

$C: r_2, s_2, \it{\bf{c\oplus t_1 \oplus t_2}}$.

To reconstruct the secret $a\oplus b\oplus c$, they can compute their sum of shares,

$A: (a\oplus r_1 \oplus r_2)\oplus s_1\oplus t_1$

$B: r_1\oplus( b\oplus s_1 \oplus s_2)\oplus t_2$

$C: r_2\oplus s_2\oplus( c\oplus t_1 \oplus t_2)$.

  • 1
    $\begingroup$ Looks like HW...how have you already tried to approach this problem? $\endgroup$
    – DrLecter
    Nov 20, 2013 at 7:58
  • $\begingroup$ @DrLecter I have edited my question. $\endgroup$ Nov 20, 2013 at 8:17
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    $\begingroup$ Your current method suggests to be you've slightly misunderstood the question. $a,b,c$ are created by A,B and C respectively. The protocol you describe requires them to be known in advance by some 4th party, which does not exist in the scenario given. $\endgroup$ Nov 20, 2013 at 11:10
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    $\begingroup$ @freak_warrior I guess in the last step you mean compute and publish their sum of shares. Yes, then it works and A B and C can compute $f(a\oplus b \oplus c)$ without learning the other's inputs. $\endgroup$
    – DrLecter
    Nov 20, 2013 at 12:19
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    $\begingroup$ Is $f(a,b,c)=a+b+c$ or $a\oplus b\oplus c$? $\endgroup$
    – mikeazo
    Nov 20, 2013 at 12:58

1 Answer 1


Your protocol is good (assuming an honest-but-curious adversary model). As DrLecter pointed out, each party will need to publish their sum of shares. To recover the answer, each party then simply xors all published values.


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