NO! AES is rated to withstand cryptanalysis so long as it remains a black box to the attacker (IE:round keys are unknown variables). Up until the SHA3 competition no one had done cryptanalysis on AES with known internal state. This is the relevant paper, specifically section 3.5 which solves the exact problem you are proposing. Given AES with a fixed key
K acting as a pseudorandom permutation, find a solution to
C=AESenc(P,K) with restrictions on
There are also attacks on AES when used as a typical hash compression function (IE:
state[i]=AES(state[i-1],K=data[i]). These allow for collisions and generally for breaking the pseudorandom permutation property of AES to find specific solutions for equations involving it.
There are probably some problems that remain hard, like reversing a one way function composed from AES (IE:
Y=F(X) , Find
Y). Even here I'd be nervous but much less so. This is the ideal case. No degrees of freedom for the attacker to work with.
When you see "secure pseudorandom permutation" thrown around in the context of AES remember the fine print attached to all that analysis: "for unknown