Which techniques could be applied to AES to prevent these kind of attacks?

I can just think of creating noise with a parallel process for random computation, so the signals have the combination of that process and the crypto process.

  • 2
    $\begingroup$ Depends on hardware at hand, which is not described. $\endgroup$
    – fgrieu
    Oct 20 '18 at 20:01
  • 1
    $\begingroup$ Why does it depend on hardware? Sorry Im just learning about this topic. $\endgroup$ Oct 20 '18 at 20:18
  • 2
    $\begingroup$ @Mr.Goferito This is a very open question. The answer is different depending on if you running on a CPU, FPGA, etc. As an example, my async ICs do not suffer from power attacks, so you cannot even cause this attack. $\endgroup$
    – b degnan
    Oct 22 '18 at 12:52
  • DPA-resistant cores

  • Masking (attempt to conceal the intermediate date processed by modifying the data such that the complete secret is never processed simultaneously)

For example you can introduce s-box shuffling in AES as a software solution to decrease the likelihood that the attack succeeds.

Pseudo Code s-box shuffling from Figure 2 of www.indjst.org/index.php/indjst/article/download/61626/48132:

// The assignment of Round Key
Byte RK[11][16]
// The generation of Random Value
shuffle = rand()%8
// The execution of Key Expansion
KeyExpansion(Byte Masterkey[16], Byte Roundkey[11][16])
// The assignment of the execution of eight-shuffling AES
(*ptr_shuffle[8])(Byte PT[16], Byte RK[11][16], Byte CT[16])
ptr_shuffle[0] = &AES_Original1
ptr_shuffle[1] = &AES_Original1_Macro
ptr_shuffle[2] = &AES_Original2
ptr_shuffle[3] = &AES_Original2_Macro
ptr_shuffle[4] = &AES_Bertoni
ptr_shuffle[5] = &AES_Bertoni_Macro
ptr_shuffle[6] = &AES_T-Table
ptr_shuffle[7] = &AES_T-Table_Macro
// The execution of eight-shuffling AES
ptr_shuffle[shuffle](PT, RK, CT))

Your Answer

By clicking “Post Your Answer”, you agree to our terms of service, privacy policy and cookie policy

Not the answer you're looking for? Browse other questions tagged or ask your own question.