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Results tagged with padding-oracle
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user 112864
A side-channel attack on implementations of encryption modes that use padding (e.g. ECB, CBC) that uses information leaked during decryption of tampered ciphertext values to derive information about the plaintext.
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CBC KEY recovery when KEY=IV
We have access to an encryption and decryption server with the following implementation. How can we get the secret key by interacting with this server?
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
KEY = ?
def encr …
- 3