I've been thinking about a geometric picture for El-Gamal. The idea is to understand the set $\{(my^{x},g^x) \mid x \in Z_p\}$ (the set of encryption of $m$ for fixed $g$ and $y$) by taking the $\log_g$ and getting $\{(\log m + x\log y, x) \mid x \in Z_p\}$, which is a line on a plane. Decryption corresponds to finding the $y$-intercept; this is possible if you know $\log y$. Re-encryption corresponds to moving a point on the line to another random point on the same line; this is possible if you know a point on the line (a ciphertext) and a vector parallel to the line (or simply another point on the line). Notice that since El-Gamal is IND-CPA, knowing two points on the line is not sufficient to determine the $y$-intercept.
Of course, one needs to determine what geometric operations are efficiently computable. Vector scaling by $\lambda$ is efficiently computable. Vector addition is efficiently computable. Vector difference is efficiently computable.
The main benefit is that it makes some sense, to me, of the homomorphic properties of El-Gamal.
Any references for this point of view? Further thought seems to show that the Computational Diffie-Hellman and Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumptions have a very elegant formulation. The Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption is that you can't tell whether two vectors are parallel.
[edit] This looks relevant: https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/377.pdf