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1

No, the way that it is described, the solution is insecure. The chunks themselves are of course secure. That is: as long as you verify the authentication tag and if the IV is indeed unique, i.e. a nonce as required by GCM. However, an adversary can simply switch around the chunks in the file, including the IV and authentication tag. That way the file can be ...


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If is not possible to reversibly compress a 64-bit RSA key (nor a 64-bit prime) into 10 digits after the fact: there are just too many such keys or primes to assign them a unique 10-digit value. And at this size RSA is totally insecure, I mean breakable in a fraction of a second. Even 640-bit is insecure, see history or factorization records there. However, ...


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For modern ciphers when well-implemented, no: encrypting different versions of the same plaintext(s) with the same key does not make the cipher attackable. That's because adversaries having access to nearly the same data encrypted multiple times is part of what's assumed in the baseline attack model for all modern ciphers: Choosen Plaintext Attack. The ...


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Knowing that all the files are the same would fall in terms of difficulty between a ciphertext only attack and a known plaintext attack. In the ciphertext only attack, the hacker knows the ciphertext of each file/message and nothing else. For a known plaintext attack, the hacker knows the contents (plaintext) of each file (even if those contents are ...


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