# Tag Info

6

A 160-bit seed is plenty for a cryptographically-secure PRNG. We are not going to be able to count to 2160 any time soon, so there is no need to worry that this is a "gaping hole". While in theory Linux's random driver may have a larger keyspace, it's not going to make a difference in real life. Fortune does have advantages over Yarrow, but a larger key size ...

4

Are there any other issues, besides the randomness of the 256-bit private key to consider? Not really. The DLog problem really doesn't have any 'weak keys', that is, keys that can be broken with less effort than other keys. Now, you might say "hey, isn't the key '1' easier to break than others?" Not really; you might consider '1' easy to break because $g^... 2 An EdDSA signature is a sequence of bytes encoded according to the EdDSA paper or its extension to more curves, or according to RFC 8032, which should be treated as opaque by callers. In particular, for an instance of EdDSA on a curve$E$over a field$\mathbb F_p$of order$p < 2^{b-1}$: A public key is a$b$-bit bit string$n \mathbin\| \underline y\$ ...

2

Yes, in fact it is quite simple. You are looking at the round subkeys for what is called the equivalent inverse cipher. The decryption round subkeys are generated by performing the InverseMixColumns operation on the encryption round key, the exact same operation used by the decryption function. The code you posted uses a series of byte table lookups (U1 to ...

Only top voted, non community-wiki answers of a minimum length are eligible