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The hash idea isn't great. See Kerckhoffs's principle. The underlying secret is still the four digit PIN, which is only $4 \times -\log_2(10) = 13$ bits of security. And don't we all pick '1234' anyway? You can use a key derivation function like Argon2 (there are others). That slows down hackers attempts at guessing your PIN. You could aim for something like ...

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Fundamentally, there isn't, because there's way too few combinations. You can however look into some practical measures some systems use to mitigate weak PINs or passwords like these. One technique is to combine the PIN or weak passwords with a strong secret key that the user however is not required to memorize or manage. Perhaps most famous example is how ...

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As there is some minimal attempt in solving I will answer at least in part. No 128! would be the number of permutations. But that is not what we are doing, we 128 is already the number of possibilities to combine 7 bits $2^7$ if you have 8 of these then you get: $128^8$ or alternatively bitwise $2^{56}$ yes no, 26 letters. need $\log_2(26)$ bits or just ...

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AES-GCM is not the same thing as AES. AES-GCM uses a 96-bit IV, or transforms a non-96-bit IV into a 96-bit IV before use. The particular constraints of the RBG and Deterministic constructions mean that not all of those 96 bits are expected to change between invocations. An IV collision (two uses of the same IV with a given key) is catastrophic to GCM's ...

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