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62 votes
4 answers
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Polynomial-time Quantum Algorithms for Lattice Problems

A new paper, by Yilei Chen, whose title is Quantum Algorithms for Lattice Problems (https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/555) appeared on eprint and it claims to solve hard lattice problems, such as the ...
Hilder Vitor Lima Pereira's user avatar
33 votes
3 answers
5k views

New quantum attack on lattices (or Shor strikes again)?

Lior Eldar and Peter W. Shor published a paper on arXiv.org in which they present a new quantum algorithm against a variant of BDD. They claim that their new algorithm can efficiently solve the ...
mephisto's user avatar
  • 2,958
20 votes
1 answer
1k views

Quantum complexity of LWE

As per my understanding, LWE is quantum secure because there is no known quantum algorithm to solve LWE in polynomial time. Due to the reductions given by Regev et al., if there is any algorithm that ...
Rick's user avatar
  • 1,295
16 votes
4 answers
8k views

Kyber and Dilithium explained to primary school students?

Kyber and Dilithium are post-quantum cryptographic designs, but the resources are hard to understand. Is it possible to explain those ciphers to children?
Flan1335's user avatar
  • 371
15 votes
1 answer
1k views

Impact of Ryan and Heninger's CRYPTO 2023 paper on post quantum cryptosystems

From Schneier's blog, which seems to have been written in response to a somewhat recent Quanta magazine article: The winner of the Best Paper Award at CRYPTO this year (2023) was a significant ...
kodlu's user avatar
  • 23.7k
14 votes
3 answers
1k views

Why are only lattice problems used in cryptography?

There are thousands of NP-hard problems out there. Why have only lattice problems been applied to cryptography?
Little Nan's user avatar
14 votes
1 answer
2k views

Is lattice-based cryptography practical?

How viable is lattice-based cryptography in a "practical" setting? It has been said that lattice-based cryptography would be a "post-quantum" cryptography scheme, but is it feasibly implementable?
Steven Sagona's user avatar
13 votes
5 answers
3k views

Why is lattice-based cryptography believed to be hard against quantum computer?

Why is lattice-based cryptography believed to be hard against quantum computer? Learning With Errors(LWE) problem (reduction to SVP) is just one example. Can you provide some intuition of the ...
mallea's user avatar
  • 1,685
13 votes
1 answer
3k views

Why did NIST select Kyber and Dilithium?

NIST selected Kyber for key agreement and Dilithium for digital signature applications some days ago. But IDF's MATZOV group, in their paper, broke Kyber and Dilithium and brought the security levels ...
Daniel's user avatar
  • 131
13 votes
0 answers
711 views

Potential Flaws With Lattice Based Cryptography?

From researching post-quantum cryptographic schemes it seems hash-based and lattice-based algorithms are the most promising (MQ-based seem to be covered by patents and have more potential unknowns ...
CoryG's user avatar
  • 589
12 votes
1 answer
2k views

Current Consensus on Security of Lattice Based Cryptography?

In an edit to an answer by user forest, it was mentioned that there has been a new attack developed for lattice-based cryptography. I thought lattice-based cryptography is a fairly well established ...
Steven Sagona's user avatar
12 votes
3 answers
1k views

Error-correcting Code VS Lattice-based Crypto

I'm not an expert in PQ-crypto, but as I understand error-correcting code and lattice-based crypto, the cryptographic assumptions are very similar. The key difference for me is the nature of the noise....
Ievgeni's user avatar
  • 2,635
11 votes
1 answer
3k views

Is the "New Hope" Lattice Key Exchange vulnerable to a lattice analog of the Bernstein BADA55 Attack?

In the paper, "Post Quantum Key Exhange - A New Hope," the authors present a lattice-based key exchange based on the work of Chris Peikert. In this "New Hope" key exchange the authors try to gain ...
Andrea Russo's user avatar
9 votes
2 answers
606 views

Peikert's framework for attacks on R-LWE: What "reduction modulo q" means?

I am reading Peikert's paper [Pei16] about secure instantiating of R-LWE problem. In section 3.1, The author gives a new attack framework by using "reduction modulo an ideal divisor $\mathfrak{q}$ of ...
Hamidreza's user avatar
  • 1,039
9 votes
1 answer
645 views

Converting NewHope/LWE key exchange to a Diffe-Hellman-like algorithm

By a “Diffe-Hellman-like” algorithm, I mean one that has the same API as Curve25519, etc (disregarding trivial differences such as the size of parameters): a function $$F: (P_\text{other}, S_\text{...
Demi's user avatar
  • 4,813
9 votes
1 answer
2k views

Discrete Gaussian Sampling role in Lattice-Based Crypto?

I'm reading up on how post-quantum cryptography works, and stumbled upon the notion of discrete Gaussian sampling. However, I can't understand where it fits in the greater picture - currently it feels ...
Daniel B's user avatar
  • 357
9 votes
2 answers
744 views

Is NTRU broken?

Today a new paper appeared on ePrint, "Improved Provable Reduction of NTRU and Hypercubic Lattices". It claims that: this is the first provable result showing that breaking NTRU lattices ...
swineone's user avatar
  • 880
9 votes
3 answers
2k views

What is a purpose of reducing lattice basis?

This may be too broad question but it is not. I have been studying lattices for few months now, more specifically I studied: Lattice problems ($SVP$, $CVP$ and etc.) Lattice cryptography in post ...
Node.JS's user avatar
  • 322
9 votes
0 answers
874 views

Can LWE be NP-hard?

Regev's reduction shows that LWE is quantumly at least as hard as CVP with an approximation factor of $n/\alpha$ for $0<\alpha<1$. But I just watched this talk which said that if $\sqrt{n/\log n}...
Sam Jaques's user avatar
  • 1,614
9 votes
0 answers
177 views

Differences between “NewHope” and “NewHope-simple”

The well-known paper described a key exchange (KE) scheme named "NewHope" on USENIX 2016. The authors then proposed "NewHope-Simple" - a PKE/KEM scheme. They also submitted "NewHope for NIST" - ...
Zachary's user avatar
  • 187
8 votes
2 answers
1k views

LWE: Round a continuous Gaussian to a true Discrete Gaussian

Short version: how is it possible to round a continuous Gaussian into a true discrete Gaussian (usually denoted $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z},\alpha q}$)? The goal is to obtain a reduction from continuous ...
Léo Colisson's user avatar
8 votes
0 answers
316 views

How are the constants found in the AVX2 implementation of CRYSTALS-KYBER round 2 generated?

The post-quantum lattice-based cryptosystem CRYSTALS-KYBER which has made it to the second round of NIST PQC includes two implementations: 1) a baseline reference implementation in C and 2) an ...
caesar's user avatar
  • 315
7 votes
1 answer
558 views

Irreducible polynomial in Ring-LWE

In Ring-LWE polynomials are chosen from the ring $R_q=\mathbb{Z}_q[x]/(x^n+1)$, where $n$ is a power of two. As far as I understand, to create a ring the polynomial $x^n+1$ has to be irreducible (see ...
Rick's user avatar
  • 1,295
7 votes
1 answer
3k views

What is the difference between Module-LWE and Ring-LWE?

Recently, the CRYSTALS lattice-based cryptographic suite has been published, which is based on "module lattices". What is Module-LWE? How is it different from Ring-LWE?
Naruto999's user avatar
  • 438
7 votes
1 answer
365 views

Is LPN not as important as LWE and SVP?

I've been learning about lattice cryptography and have noticed that most resources such as this survey by Chris Peikart, the Winter School on Lattice Cryptography etc don't include material on LPN, ...
fraiser's user avatar
  • 448
7 votes
1 answer
687 views

Decision to Search LWE when modulus $q=p^e$

I am reading Applebaum et al.. In Lemma 1. (page 7), Applebaum et al. proved the decision to search reduction when the modulus $q=p^e$ for prime $p$. In the proof, they define the hybrid ...
M.Z.'s user avatar
  • 165
7 votes
1 answer
302 views

IND-CCA2 post-quantum key exchange

QUIC requires that servers reuse keys so that session resumption works. That breaks many post-quantum key exchange systems. I am looking for a post-quantum key exchange algorithm with the following ...
Demi's user avatar
  • 4,813
6 votes
3 answers
2k views

Why do Problems for Post-Quantum algorithms have to be NP-Hard?

The mathematical problems used for Post-Quantum Cryptography problems I came across, are NP-complete, e.g. Solving quadratic equations over finite fields short lattice vectors and close lattice ...
Marc's user avatar
  • 317
6 votes
1 answer
350 views

NTRU Cryptosystem: Why "rotated" coefficients of key f work the same as f

In the NTRU cryptosystem, we can use a randomly generated polynomial f that is inversible under modulo p and q to encrypt and decrypt our plaintext. While studying this system, I attempted to ...
Ymi's user avatar
  • 175
6 votes
4 answers
1k views

Why Module-LWE and not Ring-LWE?

I am trying to understand the NIST-submissions for post-quantum cryptography a bit better, and I noticed that the submissions from the CRYSTALS-family in particular is based on Module-LWE. I ...
user110127's user avatar
6 votes
1 answer
796 views

Do we need the quantum random oracle model (QROM)?

I am currently studying the proof of the Dilithium signature in the quantum random oracle model (QROM). I am curious to hear if anyone have any thoughts on the importance of having proofs in the QROM ...
Rory's user avatar
  • 343
6 votes
1 answer
125 views

Do the specific powers of two $2^{23}$ and $2^{13}$ in the modulus $q = 2^{23} - 2^{13} + 1 = 8380417$ have any special purpose in its design?

I recently started exploring Post-Quantum Cryptography, particularly Lattice-based Cryptography, and came across the modulus $q = 2^{23} - 2^{13} + 1 = 8380417$, which is used in schemes like ...
a15600712's user avatar
5 votes
1 answer
346 views

How the condition $s \geq 8$ is determined in Lindner-Peikert cryptosystem?

In Lindner & Peikert paper, the authors propose that to set the cryptosystem's parameters, one should choose $q$ to be large enough to allow for a Gaussian parameter $s \geq 8$. My question is, ...
Hamidreza's user avatar
  • 1,039
5 votes
3 answers
314 views

How to reconstruct low order bits of $t$ of CRYSTALS-Dilithium from a small number of signatures?

In FIPS 204 (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.204.ipd.pdf): "The vector $\textbf{t}$ is compressed in the actual public key by dropping the $d$ least significant bits from each ...
Jong Hyeok Lee's user avatar
5 votes
1 answer
253 views

Shortest Vector Problem as Dihedral Hidden Subgroup Problem

I’m a mathematician trying to get into cryptography. I have a somewhat silly question, but I can’t seem to find a proper answer anywhere. I am interested in whether or not there is a way to directly ...
Joe's user avatar
  • 101
5 votes
1 answer
285 views

$L^3$ Grover search of NTRU variants

I was reading a text on cryptology by Wayne Patterson and came across the $L^3$ algorithm which reduces integer lattices with respect to their base. I've also read on the NIST CFP A8 that attacks ...
floor cat's user avatar
  • 214
5 votes
1 answer
239 views

What is the effect of low rank dual sublattices on the dual lattice attack on LWE?

In the dual lattice attack of Espitau, Joux and Kharchenko (On a dual/hybrid approach to small secret LWE), the authors propose distinguishing (and subsequently recovering secret values) of LWE ...
Daniel S's user avatar
  • 26.4k
5 votes
1 answer
128 views

Ring LWE distribution definitions

This may be a stupid question but I've been stuck on parsing these definitions for a while. I am reading the paper "On Ideal Lattices and Learning with Errors Over Rings" by Lyubashevsky, ...
cryptolearner's user avatar
5 votes
0 answers
300 views

Why is it safe to generate the secret key and masking vectors using rejection sampling in CRYSTALS-Dilithium?

In CRYSTALS-Dilithium module lattice-based digital signatures, the secret key vectors $s_1, s_2$ with coefficients in $[-\eta, \eta]$ and the signature masking vector $y$ with coefficients in $(-\...
Naruto999's user avatar
  • 438
5 votes
0 answers
128 views

How does error distribution affect security in lattices?

It's easy to see that the crucial part of any lattice scheme is the added error. And different schemes seem to use different error distributions, some use Gaussian some use centered Binomial. Though, ...
user avatar
4 votes
1 answer
734 views

RLWE Explanation

In RLWE, we often choose the following polynomial ring, where q is a prime, and n is a power of 2, e.g. $2^k$ $$\mathbb Z_q[X]/(X^n + 1)$$ We know that ${X^{2^k}} + 1$ is an irreducible polynomial ...
fuo55631's user avatar
4 votes
2 answers
339 views

Testing of PQC NIST round3 submissions

I am new to this field and have some concerns regarding PQC; How does NIST do a comparison that a particular algorithm is efficient and its security can not be broken by future quantum attacks? I am ...
Abdul Muneeb's user avatar
4 votes
1 answer
197 views

Famous ideal lattices

I am wondering if there exist some special rings $R$ that gives us, under the canonical embedding, some special lattices, like the root lattices, Barnes-Wall lattices, Leech lattices, ... In more ...
C.S.'s user avatar
  • 505
4 votes
2 answers
661 views

Why does Learning With Errors require a bunch of samples?

Solving Learning with Errors(LWE) with average case complexity is as hard as solving the SVP with worst case complexity. LWE requires $n$ dimensional lattice and $m$ samples of it, and Decisional-LWE ...
mallea's user avatar
  • 1,685
4 votes
1 answer
290 views

Would LWE problem be still secure if error were like this $e=2e_1$?

In the Learning with error problem, if the error term $e$ from equation $b=<a,s>/q+e$ were of this kind $e=2e_1$, where $e_1$ is chosen according to the probability distribution for the LWE ...
guglielmo london's user avatar
4 votes
1 answer
136 views

In reduction from search LWE to decsion LWE why sampling needs to repeat a polynomial number of times?

I've been reading through MIT's lecture notes on learning with errors here, and I'm trying to understand the reduction from Search LWE to Decision LWE, as described there in Section 2.7, "...
Anon's user avatar
  • 413
4 votes
1 answer
568 views

What is the largest parameter broken for NTRU?

The original secure parameters for NTRU shown below are from the original HPS98 paper. This is vastly different from the current secure suggested parameters in the NIST PQC round 3 submission. ...
evernal's user avatar
  • 237
4 votes
1 answer
373 views

Adapting LWE Trapdoors for Ring-LWE

In the paper Trapdoors for Lattices: Simpler, Tighter, Faster, Smaller by Micciancio and Peikert, they present the following theorem about the existence of trapdoor for LWE. Theorem 5.1: There is an ...
P.B.'s user avatar
  • 516
4 votes
1 answer
611 views

Dilithium signature scheme and timing attacks – Does the running time actually depend on the secret key?

The paper “CRYSTALS – Dilithium: Digital Signatures from Module Lattices” (by Léo Ducas, Tancrède Lepoint, Vadim Lyubashevsky, Peter Schwabe, Gregor Seiler, and Damien Stehlé) introduces a digital ...
Demi's user avatar
  • 4,813
4 votes
1 answer
139 views

"Shifting" a dual-Regev keypair away from a trapdoored instance

This question pertains to identity-based key encapsulation mechanisms (IB-KEMs). To recap the functionality: $\mathsf{KeyGen}(1^\lambda) \to (\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{mpk})$ Generates the master keypair ...
rozbb's user avatar
  • 430